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Ineﬃciencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as important
factors in retarding economic development. Why certain societies choose or end up with such
ineﬃcient organizations has received very little attention, however. In this paper, we present
a simple theory of the emergence and persistence of ineﬃcient states based on patronage
politics. The society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but
expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires
the employment of bureaucrats. We show that, under certain circumstances, by choosing
an ineﬃcient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic
politics. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision
in democracy. Moreover, the ineﬃcient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist
over time. Intuitively, an ineﬃcient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than
would an eﬃcient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform
the structure of the state to make it more eﬃcient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower
cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with
an ineﬃcient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but
also provide rents to bureaucrats. We show that in order to generate enough political support,
the coalition of the rich and the bureaucrats may not only choose an ineﬃcient organization of
the state, but they may expand the size of bureaucracy “excessively” so as to gain additional
votes. The model shows that an equilibrium with an ineﬃcient state is more likely to arise
when there is greater inequality between the rich and the poor, when bureaucratic rents take
intermediate values and when individuals are suﬃciently forward-looking.
Keywords: bureaucracy, corruption, democracy, patronage politics, political economy,
public goods, redistributive politics.
JEL Classiﬁcation: P16, H11, H26, H41.
∗We thank Timothy Besley, Bruno Contini, Miriam Golden, Gilles Saint-Paul, Guido Tabellini and seminar
participants at IGIER-Bocconi, the Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Toulouse University,
and Yale University for useful comments and suggestions. Acemoglu gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support
from the National Science Foundation and the hospitality of the Yale Economics Department. Vindigni gratefully
acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo Alberto and of the Yale Leitner Program in International Political
Economy.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are large cross-country diﬀerences in the extent of bureaucratic corruption and the
eﬃciency of the state organization (e.g., World Bank, 2004). An inﬂuential argument, dating
back at least to Tilly (1990), maintains that diﬀerences in “state capacity” are an important
determinant of economic development.1 The evidence that many less-developed economies in
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America only have a small fraction of their GDP raised
in tax revenue and invested by the government (e.g., Acemoglu, 2005) and the correlation
between measures of state capacity and economic growth (e.g., Rauch and Evans, 2000) are
also consistent with this view. Societies with limited state capacity are also those that invest
relatively little in public goods and do not adopt policies that redistribute resources to the
poor.2 Brazil provides a typical example of a society, where the state sector has been relatively
ineﬃcient and democratic politics has generated only limited public goods and beneﬁts for the
poor (e.g., Gay, 1990, Evans, 1992, Weyland 1996, Roett, 1999).
In this paper, we construct a political economy model, which links the emergence and
persistence of ineﬃcient states to the strategic use of patronage politics by the elite as a means
of capturing democratic politics. Democratic capture enables the elite to limit the provision
of public goods and redistribution, but at the cost of aggregate ineﬃciencies. Our approach
therefore provides a uniﬁed answer to the questions of: (i) why ineﬃcient states emerge in
some societies; (ii) what explains the prevalence of patronage politics and its association with
greater ineﬃciencies in bureaucracy; and (iii) why many democracies pursue relatively pro-
elite policies. Our model also suggests a potential reason why certain democracies may exhibit
relatively poor economic performance and adopt various ineﬃcient policies.
Our model economy consists of two groups, the rich elite and poor citizens. Linear taxes can
b ei m p o s e do nb o t hg r o u p s ,w i t ht h ep r o c e e d su s e dt oﬁnance public good investments. The
rich are generally opposed to high levels of taxes and public good investments. Tax collection
requires that the state employs bureaucrats to prevent individuals from evading taxes, but
bureaucrats themselves also need to be given incentives so that they exert eﬀort (or do not
accept bribes). The eﬃciency with which a central authority can monitor the bureaucrats is our
measure of the “organization of the state”. Political competition is modeled either by assuming
the existence of two parties, respectively aligned with the rich and the poor, or by allowing free
entry into the political arena by citizen candidates (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and
Coate, 1997). In both cases, there is no commitment to policies before elections and the party
1See, for example, Evans (1989, 1995), Levi (1989), Migdal (1988), Epstein (2000), Herbst (2000), Centeno
(2002) and Kohli (2004).
2See, for example, Etzioni-Halevy (1983) on the importance of state capacity and bureaucratization for the
development of the welfare state in the West, and Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) on the importance of state
capacity for income redistribution.
1that comes to power chooses the policy vector, including taxes, public good provision, and
bureaucratic wages, and whether to reform the eﬃciency of the state institutions. Democratic
political competition is made interesting by the fact that bureaucrats may support either the
rich or poor parties (candidates) and their support may be pivotal in the outcome of elections.3
We consider two possible organizations of the state: the ﬁrst is an “eﬃcient” organization,
in which bureaucrats will be detected easily if they fail to exert eﬀort, while the second is an
“ineﬃcient” one in which monitoring bureaucrats is diﬃcult. In equilibrium, when the state is
ineﬃcient, bureaucrats need to be paid rents in order to induce them to perform their roles of
tax collection and inspection. The presence of rents creates the possibility of patronage politics,
whereby bureaucrats may support the party that will maintain the ineﬃcient structure.4
In a society that is always dominated by the rich elite or that is permanently in democracy
(with a poor citizen as the median voter), the political process produces an eﬃcient organization
of bureaucracy, since an ineﬃcient state creates additional costs and no beneﬁts for those
holding power. Our main result is that when the society starts out as nondemocratic (under
the control of the rich elite) and is expected to transition to democracy, the rich may ﬁnd it
beneﬁcial to choose an ineﬃcient organization of the state so as to exploit patronage politics to
limit redistribution. In particular, bureaucrats realize that once the poor median voter comes
to power in democracy, there will be bureaucratic reform, reducing their rents from then on.
Therefore, if the rich elite, when in power, choose an ineﬃcient organization of the state,
the current bureaucrats–who are receiving rents–prefer to support the rich rather than vote
with the poor. Consequently, an ineﬃcient state organization emerges as a political instrument
for the rich elite to capture the democratic decision-making process by fostering a coalition
between themselves and the bureaucrats. It is also noteworthy that the ineﬃcient state not
only emerges in equilibrium, but also persists; when the state is ineﬃcient, the bureaucrats
vote for the party of the rich, which chooses not to reform the bureaucracy and continues to
maintain the support of the existing bureaucrats and thus its political power.
Our analysis shows that patronage politics typically leads not only to the emergence and
persistence of an ineﬃcient state apparatus, but also to the overemployment of bureaucrats.
This is because the rich may prefer to hire additional (unnecessary) bureaucrats so as to boost
their party’s votes. Consequently, a captured democracy will typically feature an ineﬃcient
state (bureaucracy), provide relatively few public goods and employ an excessive number of
3Throughout the paper, we focus on Markov perfect equilibria (where strategies only depend on payoﬀ-
relevant state variables). This equilibrium concept implies that there is no commitment to policies before
elections and thus enables us to illustrate the logic of patronage politics in the clearest fashion. Equilibria with
patronage politics are easier to support as non-Markovian subgame perfect equilibria.
4The assumption that the main role of bureaucrats is tax inspection is not essential in our basic model. The
important feature is that an ineﬃcient state organization must pay bureaucrats rents in order to provide them
with the right incentives. Bureaucrats’ role as tax inspectors becomes important in the extension in subsection
5.3, where they can be bribed by producers for tax evasion. We simplify the presentation by assuming that
bureaucrats’ main role is tax inspection throughout.
2bureaucrats. This pattern of bureaucratic ineﬃciency is consistent with the stylized view of
corrupt and low-capacity bureaucracies in many less developed countries (e.g., Geddes, 1991,
and Rauch and Evans, 2000).5
We also show that the equilibrium with an ineﬃcient state is more likely when there is
greater inequality. This is because greater inequality raises the equilibrium tax rate in democ-
racy and makes it more appealing for the rich to create an ineﬃcient state apparatus to prevent
democratic outcomes. An ineﬃcient state also requires intermediate levels of rents/“eﬃciency
wages” for bureaucrats; when rents are limited, bureaucrats would not support the rich, while
too high rents would make the ineﬃcient state equilibrium prohibitively costly for the rich
elite. Finally, an ineﬃcient state is more likely to arise when agents are more forward-looking,
because bureaucrats support the ineﬃcient state in order to obtain future rents.
It is worth emphasizing that in our model patronage politics and the creation of an ineﬃ-
cient state are the only way for the rich to increase their votes and inﬂuence in politics. This
is not meant to imply that there are no other, complementary methods of democratic capture.
Instead, our purpose is to isolate a particular mechanism that appears to be important in
practice and investigate its implications.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of a
number of case studies that illustrate how patronage politics has been used to limit redis-
tribution towards the poor and also discusses the related literature. Section 3 outlines the
basic economic and political environment. Section 4 characterizes the equilibria of the base-
line model both under permanent nondemocratic and democratic regimes as benchmarks, and
more importantly, under a regime that starts out as nondemocratic and becomes democratic
thereafter. We show that in this last political environment the rich elite may choose an in-
eﬃcient state organization and a suﬃciently large bureaucracy in order to create a majority
coalition. Section 5 generalizes this framework in a number of directions; in particular, it
allows for more general contracts with bureaucrats, considers a citizen-candidate setup for po-
litical competition, and allows producers to bribe bureaucrats to evade taxes. Section 6 brieﬂy
investigates a distinctive implication of our approach about the relationship between relative
5Even with the overemployment of bureaucrats, bureaucrats and the rich elite are unlikely to have an
absolute majority in the electorate. In practice, the elite may be able to gain additional inﬂuence using other,
complementary methods such as lobbying, vote buying or use of paramilitaries (see footnote 6). In addition,
the lower turnout rates of relatively poor individuals may further limit the political power of parties favoring
less pro-elite policies.
6Other methods via which a rich elite may have disproportionate eﬀect in a democracy include lobbying, vote
buying and use of force and paramilitaries. Lobbying is discussed extensively in the literature, but typically not
in this context, see, for example, Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1994), and Grossman and Helpman (1996). See
also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) on democratic capture and use of force and paramilitaries in democracies.
Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001) construct models in which parties can make
credible promises to “vote buying” transfers or to group-speciﬁc public goods. Our assumption that there is no
commitment to future actions combined with our focus on Markov perfect equilibria imply that such strategies
are not feasible in our model.
3wages of public sector employees and the amount of public good provision in democracies. We
report cross-country correlations consistent with this implication. Section 7 concludes, while
the Appendix contains some of the proofs omitted from the text.
2 Motivation and Related Literature
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss a number of case studies that motivate our analysis and also
relate our paper to the existing literature in political economy.
2.1 Patronage Politics, Ineﬃcient States and Elite Control
The experiences of many societies in Latin America, Asia and Africa illustrate the link between
patronage politics, ineﬃcient states and elite control. Here we brieﬂy mention three cases.
Perhaps the most transparent example of ineﬃcient and oversized bureaucracy comes from
Brazil. Several authors (e.g. Gay, 1990, Weyland 1996, Roett, 1999) have argued that the
distribution of large numbers of public jobs, both in the public administration and in paras-
tatal organizations, has created a pattern of patronage politics in Brazil.7 The control over
these jobs has enabled traditional elites to preserve their political power and limit the amount
of public good provision and redistribution. In fact, despite the high level of inequality in
Brazil, elites have been able to control politics for much of the 20th century with only limited
amount of repression and relatively short periods of military rule. Interestingly, the amount
of redistribution and public good provision does not show marked diﬀerences between military
and democratic periods.
Patronage politics has often ensured that even those in poorest neighborhoods of Rio have
supported the traditional parties rather than socialist or social democratic parties running
on platforms of greater public good provision and redistribution (Gay, 1990). Students of
Brazilian politics have noted the role of public sector employees in this process. For example,
Roett (1999 p. 91) writes “state company employees emerged as being among the strongest
supporter of the patrimonial order”. In return, successive governments have withstood external
pressures from the IMF and have not reformed the public sector, despite the “public perception
that public-sector workers were overpaid and underworked” (Roett, p. 97). The process of
reforming the public sector has started only recently and progressed slowly.
Another example of eﬀective patronage politics is provided by the policies of Parti So-
cialiste (PS) of President Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal. After independence, PS faced
increasing challenges from various diﬀerent opposition groups, including urban workers and
7In the early 1980s, about 4 million people had a job in some branch of the Brazilian public sector. Evans
(1992) observes that the Brazilian state is commonly recognized as a huge cabide de emprego (source of jobs) and
remarks that in contrast to the Weberian conception, recruitment of public employees in Brazil is not related
to merit but to political connections.
4farmers. Nevertheless, it managed to preserve its power, with relatively limited amount of
repression, largely owing to its use of patronage politics. In fact, Senghor promoted some
amount of political liberalization and allowed the creation of a multi-party system. However,
PS also exploited its incumbency advantage to manipulate the democratic process by creating
an extensive patronage network centered on the state apparatus and parastatal sector. Inter-
estingly, it was precisely during this period of democratization that the size of the public sector
grew substantially (Boone 1990, Beck, 1997). Boone (1990 p. 347) describes this process as:
“The strategic allocation of government jobs coopted restive intellectuals and professionals and
incorporated them into political factions anchored in the state bureaucracy.” Thanks to this
successful implementation of patronage politics, PS retained much of its power following the
transition to democracy.
A ﬁnal example of the rise of patronage politics in the face of political competition comes
from Italy. The evolution of the Italian bureaucracy in the post-WWII decades demonstrates
that the mechanism that our model identiﬁes may operate even in relatively developed coun-
tries. A signiﬁcant extension in the Italian bureaucracy was initiated by the Italian Christian
Democratic Party (DC) in the 1950s after the electoral challenge from the Communist Party
increased sharply, especially following the 1953 political elections. Until the defeat in World
War II, Italian politics was dominated by Mussolini’s dictatorship. After the war, DC emerged
as the dominant party. In the 1950s, faced by electoral challenge from the left, DC created a
highly disorganized and oversized bureaucracy, which subsequently became a natural source of
political support and patronage for the party. Golden (2003 p. 199) describes the motive for
the expansion of the bureaucracy as:
“The massive system of political patronage that the leaders of the DC constructed
after 1953 was their aggregate answer ... to enlarging the party’s aggregate vote
share while protecting the incumbency advantage of individual legislators.”
In part with the support of the bureaucracy that it created, DC’s dominance of Italian politics
continued until the 1980s and prevented the formation of a left-wing government.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a number of diﬀerent strands in the literature. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no other papers in the literature that derive an equilibrium
explanation for the various ineﬃciencies in the organization of bureaucracies and provide a
range of comparative statics showing when such ineﬃciencies are more likely.8 We are also
8The political science and sociology literature on the organization of the state and the bureaucracy mentioned
above discusses related issues, but does not provide formal models or emphasize the mechanisms we focus on
in this paper. The small economics literature on the internal organization of the state and bureaucracy, for
5not aware of any approaches that derive a micro-founded model of patronage politics, despite
the ubiquity of this type of political interactions in practice. In addition, while some papers
emphasize the impact of lobbying on political decisions,9 the issue of how elites can capture
decision-making in democracies has only been discussed in a very diﬀerent context in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006b).
Perhaps most closed the related to our work is the small literature on how politicians may
distort policies for strategic reasons. Papers in this literature include models where ineﬃcient
policies (such as excessive state employment) are chosen in order to gain votes (e.g., Fiorina
and Noll, 1978, Geddes, 1991, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, Robinson
and Torvik, 2005). Other papers focus on how certaint ineﬃcient choices (including wasteful
investments, large budget deﬁcits, and ineﬃcient ﬁscal systems) could be made in order to
constrain future politicians (e.g., Glazer, 1989, Persson and Svensson, 1989, Tabellini and
Alesina, 1990, Aghion and Bolton, 1990, Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini, 1992). None
of these papers feature the mechanism of an elite creating an ineﬃcient state structure to
maintain their political power in the face of an emerging democracy or derive a rationale for
patronage politics.10
The literature on the ineﬃciency of the form of redistribution is also related to our work.
Wilson (1990) and Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that ineﬃcient methods of redistribution
are chosen as a way of limiting the amount of redistribution (see also Coate and Morris, 1995,
Rodrik, 1995). There is a close connection between this idea and the main mechanism in
our paper, whereby an ineﬃcient state is chosen by the rich in order to limit the amount of
future redistribution. Nevertheless, there is also an important distinction; in the basic Becker-
Mulligan-Wilson story, it is not clear why the society can commit to the form of redistribution
and not to the amount of redistribution. In contrast, in our model the choice of an ineﬃcient
bureaucracy is a way of aﬀecting the future political equilibrium so as to bring the party aligned
with the interests of the rich to political power, and via this channel, to limit the provision of
public goods and taxation. As such, our mechanism is more closely related to the the models
of ineﬃcient redistribution in Saint-Paul (1996) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), where a
politically powerful group may push for ineﬃcient forms of transfers in order to maintain its
example, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Dixit (2002), Egorov and Sonin (2005) and Debs (2006), does not
investigate the relationship between patronage politics and the emergence of the ineﬃcient state as a method
of limiting redistribution.
9See, among others, Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1994), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), and Gross-
man and Helpman (1996).
10The literature on comparative politics and public ﬁnance (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2003, Ticchi and
Vindigni, 2005) also investigates sources of diﬀerences in ﬁscal policies among democracies, but does not focus
on democratic capture, patronage politics or the possibility of ineﬃcient bureaucracies. Therefore, relative to
this literature, our approach suggests an alternative, but complementary, source of variation, related to the
desire and the ability of the economic elite to dominate democratic politics, which can generate both diﬀerences
in the level of public goods provision and in the eﬃciency of the state.
6future political power. However, these papers do not model or explain how an existing elite can
capture democratic politics by creating an ineﬃcient state structure or provide a mechanism
for patronage politics.
Finally, our approach is related to sociological analyses of “cooptation” in democracy by
existing elites in some Marxist sociology and political science literatures. In particular, Ther-
born (1980 pp. 228-234) argues that the control of the state apparatus is a crucial objective of
the economic elites in democracy, which they achieve using strategies including cooptation (see
also the discussion of hegemony in Gramsci, 1971). However, this literature neither articulates
a mechanism through which the elite may accomplish these objectives nor models the costs of
such a strategy relative to other options.11
3B a s i c M o d e l
3.1 Description of the Economic Environment
Consider the following discrete time inﬁnite-horizon economy populated by a continuum 1 of













at time t =0 ,w h e r eE0 is the expectation at time t =0 ,β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, c
j
t ≥ 0
denotes the consumption of the agent in question (agent j), Gt ≥ 0 is the level of public good
enjoyed by all agents, e
j
t ∈ {0,1} is the eﬀort decision of the agent (which will be necessary in
some occupations), and h>0i st h ec o s to fe ﬀort.
There are two types of agents: n>1/2 are poor (low-skill), while 1−n are rich (high-skill).
We denote poor agents by the symbol L (corresponding to low-productivity), and rich agents
by H, and also use L and H to denote the set of poor and rich agents.
There are two occupations: producer and bureaucrat. In each period, as long as some
amount of investment in infrastructure, K>0, is undertaken, each producer generates an
income depending on his skill; AL f o rp o o ra g e n t sa n dAH >A L for rich agents. If the
investment in infrastructure K is not undertaken at time t, then no agent can produce within
that period. Producers receive and consume their income net of taxes.
A set of agents denoted by Xt are bureaucrats at time t. These agents do not produce,
but receive a net wage of wt ≥ 0 from the government (i.e., they do not pay taxes on their
11Another major diﬀerence between the Marxist approaches and ours is that in our model bureaucrats can
side either with rich or poor agents, whereas in most Marxist approaches, the state apparatus is, ultimately,
controlled by the economic elite (e.g., Miliband, 1969, Poulantzas, 1978, Therborn, 1980). In this respect, the
notion of bureaucracy and state apparatus in our model is also diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fM a xW e b e r ,w h i c hv i e w s
bureaucracy as an “apolitical” organization, with no goals or interests. See also Alford and Friedland (1985) for
a critical discussions of Marxist and non-Marxist theories of the state.
7wage income). The role of bureaucrats is tax collection. In particular, we will allow for a
linear tax rate τt ∈ [0,1] on earned incomes in order to ﬁnance the infrastructure investment
K, additional spending on the public good Gt and the wages of bureaucrats. This tax rate
is the same irrespective of whether the individual is rich or poor. To simplify the discussion,
we assume that only poor agents can become bureaucrats. This assumption is not necessary
for the results, since it will be evident below that low-productivity poor agents always prefer
bureaucracy more than the high-productivity rich agents (see Remark 2 below).
Both rich and poor agents can try to evade taxes. We assume that if an individual tries
to evade taxes, he gets caught with probability p(xt), where p :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is an increasing,
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave function with p(0) = 0, and xt denotes





tdj. This expression incorporates the fact that bureaucrats who do not exert eﬀort
are not useful.12
If an individual is caught evading taxes, all of his income during that period is lost. For
simplicity, we assume that this income does not accrue to the government either (though
this is not an important assumption). We also assume that there is full anonymity in the
market, so that the past history of individual producers is not observed. This implies that
future punishments on tax evaders are not possible. Moreover, because of limited liability, i.e.,
c
j
t ≥ 0, more serious punishments are not possible.
Since eﬀort is costly, bureaucrats will exert eﬀort only if their compensation depends on
their eﬀort decision. We assume that if they do not exert eﬀort, bureaucrats are caught with
probability qt at time t. If they are not caught, they receive the wage wt,a n di ft h e ya r e
caught shirking, they lose their wage, but are not ﬁred from the bureaucracy. This assumption
simpliﬁes the algebra and the exposition considerably and is relaxed in subsection 5.1 below.
The probability of detection qt depends on the “organization of the state”. We allow two
types of organizations, represented by It ∈ {0,1}, which correspond to diﬀerent types/degrees
of monitoring within the bureaucracy. In particular, we assume q(I = 1) = 1, so that one of the
possible organizations of the state allows for perfect monitoring of bureaucrats. In contrast,
q(I =0 ) = q0 < 1, so that the alternative organization involves an imperfect monitoring
technology and shirking bureaucrats are not necessarily detected. Clearly, imperfect monitoring
will lead to equilibrium distortions, and for this reason we refer to I = 0 as an “ineﬃcient
organization of the state” and to I =1a s“ e ﬃcient state”. To simplify the analysis we assume
12Alternatively, instead of inducing bureaucrats to exert eﬀort, it may be important to ensure that they do
not accept bribes from the individuals supposed to pay taxes (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998, 2000). We
investigate a variant of our model with corruption in subsection 5.3.
8that I = 1 has no cost relative to I =0 . 13
At each date, the political system chooses the following policies:
• A tax rate on all earned income τt ∈ [0,1].
• The wage rate for bureaucrats wt ∈ R+.
• A level of public good Gt ∈ R+.
• The number of bureaucrats hired, Xt ∈ [0,1].
• A decision on the organization of the state for the next date, It ∈ {0,1}–the eﬃciency
of the state at the current date, It−1, is part of the state variable, determined by choices
in the previous period.
The additional restrictions on these policies are as follows:
1. The government budget constraint (speciﬁed below) has to be satisﬁed at every date.
2. If Xt ≥ Xt−1, then existing bureaucrats cannot be ﬁred (although each bureaucrat can
decide to quit if he ﬁnds this beneﬁcial). Moreover, if Xt <X t−1, then no new bureaucrats
are hired and a fraction (Xt − Xt−1)/Xt of the bureaucrats is ﬁred (those ﬁred being
randomly chosen irrespective of their past history).
We denote a vector of policies satisfying these restrictions by ρt ≡ (τt,w t,G t,X t,I t) ∈ R.
3.2 Description of the Political System
We will consider three diﬀerent political environments:
1. Permanent nondemocracy: the rich elite are in power at all dates, meaning that only
the rich can vote, and since all rich agents have the same policy preferences over the
available set of policies, the policy vector most preferred by a representative rich elite
will be implemented.
2. Permanent Democracy: the citizens, who form the majority, are in power at all dates
starting at t = 0 (or at all dates there are elections as described below).
3. Emerging Democracy: the rich elite are in power at t = 0, and in all future dates, the
regime will be democratic with majoritarian elections.
13In general, one can imagine that setting up a more eﬃcient state apparatus may involve additional expen-
ditures. We ignore those both to simplify the algebra and also to highlight that ineﬃcient states can arise even
when an eﬃcient organization is costlessly available.
9The ﬁrst two environments are for comparison. The third one is our main focus in this
paper. It is a simple way of capturing the idea that some decisions are originally taken by
elites, anticipating that democracy will arrive at some point–in this case right at date t =1 . 14
To start with, we model the democratic system in a very simple way, by assuming that there
are two parties, one run by an elite agent and one run by a poor agent, and that bureaucrats
cannot run for oﬃce. We use the symbols P and R to denote these parties and dt = P
denotes that party P is elected to oﬃce at date t. Parties are unable to make commitments
to the policies they will implement once they come to power. Thus whichever party receives
the majority of the votes comes to power and the agent in control of the party chooses the
policy vector that maximizes his own utility. This last assumption departs from the standard
Downsian models of political competition where parties commit to their policy platform before
the election. Instead, it is closer to the literature on citizen-candidate models, which will be
discussed further in subsection 5.2 (see also Alesina, 1988). Speciﬁcally, in subsection 5.2,
we will consider a richer model of democratic politics, where each agent can run as a citizen-
candidate, and we will show that the same results apply with this richer setup. Nevertheless,
it is useful to start with the simpler environment with only two parties to highlight the main
economic forces.
3.3 Timing of Events
To recap, the timing of events within each date is:
• The society starts with some political regime, nondemocracy or democracy, i.e., st ∈
{N,D}, as e tXt−1 ⊂ L of agents who are already bureaucrats (since, by assumption,
the set of bureaucrats Xt−1 must be a subset of the set of poor agents), and a level of
eﬃciency of the state, It−1 ∈ {0,1}. Then:




2. In democracy, the elected party or in nondemocracy the representative elite agent decides
the policy vector ρt ≡ (τt,w t,G t,X t,I t) ∈ R.
3. Observing this vector, each individual j/ ∈ Xt−1 decides whether to apply to become a
bureaucrat, χ
j
t ∈ {0,1}, and each individual j ∈ Xt−1 decides whether to quit bureau-
cracy, χ
j
t ∈ {0,1} (which is denoted by the same symbol without any risk of confusion).
14In this case, the society is nondemocratic at date t = 0, and we assume that it will become democratic for
exogenous reasons at date t = 1. It is possible to model democratization as equilibrium institutional change along
the lines of the models of endogenous democratization in the literature (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a, for
a discussion and references), but doing so would complicate the analysis without generating additional economic
insights in the current context.
10Naturally, by assumption, χ
j
t = 0 for all the rich agents. The number of bureaucrats at








, i.e., the minimum of the number of bureaucrats chosen
by the polity in power and the number of people applying to or remaining in bureaucracy.
This also determines the current set of bureaucrats, Xt.
4. Each bureaucrat decides whether to exert eﬀort, e
j




tdj, and thus the probability of detection of individuals evading taxes.




6. A fraction p(xt) of producers evading taxes are caught.
7. A fraction qt = q(It−1) of shirking bureaucrats are caught and punished.
8. Taxes are collected, remaining bureaucrats are paid their wage, wt, and the public good
Gt is supplied.
Naturally, the society starts with X−1 = ∅, i.e., in the initial date there are no incumbent
bureaucrats. We also suppose that I−1 = 0 (though this has no bearing on any of our results
except the actions at time t = 0, since the choice of It ∈ {0,1} is without any costs).
4 Characterization of Equilibria
We now characterize the equilibrium of the environments described above.
4.1 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Throughout, we focus on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE).15
Recall that Markovian strategies condition only on the payoﬀ-relevant state variables (and
on the prior actions within the same stage game). An MPE is deﬁned as a set of Markovian
strategies that are best responses to each other given every history. In the current game, the
aggregate state vector can be represented as St ≡ (st,I t−1,X t−1) ∈ S,w h e r est ∈ {N,D} is the
political regime at time t, It−1 ∈ {0,1} is the eﬃciency of the bureaucracy inherited from the
previous period, and Xt−1 is the size of the bureaucracy inherited from the previous period.16
Individual actions will be a function of the aggregate state vector St and the individual’s
identity, in particular, at ∈ {L,H,B} representing whether the individual is a poor producer,
15We focus on MPE both because in the current context the MPE is unique and is relatively straightforward
to characterize and also because the focus on MPE makes the emergence of a coalition between the rich and
the bureaucrats more diﬃcult (since there cannot be “commitment” to future rents for bureaucrats).
16In addition, for each individual we could specify whether the individual is currently a bureaucrat, i.e.,
whether j ∈ Xt−1 and whether he is a party leader as part of the individual-speciﬁc state vector. Nevertheless,
Markovian strategies can be deﬁned without doing this, which simpliﬁes the notation.
11rich producer or a bureaucrat. Thus as a function of St and at, each individual will decide
which party to vote for, i.e., v
j
t ∈ {P,R}, whether to apply (or to remain) in bureaucracy,
χ
j
t ∈ {0,1}, whether to evade taxes, z
j
t ∈ {0,1}, if the individual is a producer, and whether
to exert eﬀort, e
j
t ∈ {0,1}, if the individual is a bureaucrat. Finally, strategies also include
the choice of It ∈ {0,1}, τt ∈ [0,1], Xt ∈ [0,n], and Gt ∈ R+ when the individual is the party
leader. Thus Markovian strategies can be represented by the following mapping
σ : S×{ L,H,B} → {P,R}×{ 0,1}
3 × [0,1] × [0,n] × R+.
An MPE is a mapping σ∗ that is best response to itself at every possible history.
We will often refer to subcomponents of σ rather than the entire strategy proﬁle, and with
a slight abuse of notation, we will use v(I | a) to denote the voting strategy of an individual
of group a ∈ {L,H,B} as a function of the eﬃciency of the state institutions. Moreover,
when there is no risk of confusion, we will use the index j to denote individuals or groups
interchangeably.
4.2 Preliminary Results
We now state a number of results that will be useful throughout the analysis. Even though
many of these results are straightforward, listing and proving them is useful for the exposition.
Lemma 1 If p(xt) <τ t,t h e nz
j
t =0for all j/ ∈ Xt, i.e., all producers evade taxes at time t.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is straightforward and is provided for completeness in
Appendix A.
Since with tax evasion there is no government revenue, Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium
we need to have the following incentive compatibility constraint for producers
p(xt) ≥ τt
to be satisﬁed. Alternatively, deﬁning
π (τ) ≡ p−1 (τ), (1)
producers’ incentive compatibility constraint can be expressed as:17
xt ≥ π(τt). (2)
This condition requires the number of bureaucrats exerting eﬀort to be greater than π (τt).
This constraint is suﬃcient to ensure that all individuals choose not to evade taxes.
Since p(·) is strictly increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave, π (·)d e ﬁned
in (1) is strictly increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly convex.
17This condition can also be interpreted as a “state capacity constraint” since, given the eﬀective size of the








t =0for all j ∈ Xt, i.e., all bureaucrats will shirk at time t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 In subsection 5.1 below, we will allow bureaucrats caught shirking to be ﬁred from
bureaucracy. In this case, it is clear that the optimal contract involves ﬁring a bureaucrat if he
is caught shirking. Given this, the condition in Lemma 2 will have to be forward-looking, taking
into account the future rents that the bureaucrat will lose if caught shirking. In particular,
imagine a stationary equilibrium, where today and in all future periods the tax rate is equal
to ˆ τ, the wage rate for bureaucrats is ˆ w, and the probability of getting caught is ˆ q, then the
necessary condition (3) would become
ˆ w − h
1 − β
< ˆ qβ
(1 − ˆ τ)AL
1 − β
+( 1− ˆ q)
µ
ˆ w + β




since the left-hand side is what the individual would receive by exerting eﬀort at every date,
whereas the right-hand side is the payoﬀ to deviating for one period, and then switching
to exerting eﬀort from then on (implicitly using the one-step ahead deviation principle, see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 4). In particular, the right-hand side has the individual
getting caught with probability ˆ q, receiving nothing today and the wage of a low-skill producer
from then on, and not getting caught with probability 1− ˆ q, in which case he receives ˆ w today
and then receives the discounted version of the left-hand side (as he switches back to exerting
eﬀort). A bureaucrat who loses his job always receives the wage of a low-skill producer from
then on, since along the equilibrium path, there will be no further hiring into bureaucracy.
Rearranging terms, the above inequality can be expressed as:
ˆ w<β(1 − ˆ τ)AL +
(1 − β (1 − ˆ q))h
ˆ q
. (4)
In a stationary equilibrium where bureaucrats are ﬁred when caught shirking, condition (4) will
replace (3), and when it is satisﬁed, all bureaucrats will shirk. Correspondingly, the incentive
compatibility constraint, (5), below will change to the converse of this condition. We return
to a further analysis of this case in subsection 5.1.
If bureaucrats are expected to shirk, all individuals will evade taxes and there will be no
tax revenues. Consequently, the infrastructure investment K could not be ﬁnanced and there
would be no production. Thus, the society also needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility





13where qt = q(It−1). This constraint is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that all bureaucrats
choose to exert eﬀort. In addition, (poor) individuals must prefer to become bureaucrats. That
is, the participation constraint
wt ≥ (1 − τt)AL + h, (6)
needs to be satisﬁed so that bureaucrats receive at least as much as they would obtain in
private production.
Remark 2 If rich agents could become bureaucrats, the equivalent participation constraint,
corresponding to (6), for rich agents would be
wt ≥ (1 − τt)AH + h.
Comparison of this inequality with condition (6) makes it clear that poor agents are always
more willing to enter bureaucracy than rich agents. Our assumption that rich agents cannot
become bureaucrats therefore enables us to avoid imposing explicit conditions to ensure that
this inequality is not satisﬁed and (6) is.
The above discussion, in particular Lemmas 1 and 2, immediately establishes the following
lemma (proof omitted):
Lemma 3 In any MPE, conditions (2), (5) and (6) must hold and e
j
t =1for all j ∈ Xt and
all t,a n dz
j
t =1for all j/ ∈ Xt and all t.
In other words, in any equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraints of producers
and bureaucrats and the participation constraint of bureaucrats are satisﬁed, and no producer
evades taxes and all bureaucrats exert eﬀort.
From Lemma 3 (and the fact that only poor agents become bureaucrats), it immediately
follows that, as long as the constraints (2) and (5) are satisﬁed, the government budget con-
straint can be written as:
K + Gt + wtXt ≤ (1 − n)τtAH +( n − Xt)τtAL, (7)
where the left-hand side is government expenditures, consisting of the investment in infras-
tructure, spending on public goods and bureaucrats’ wages, while the right-hand side is total
government tax receipts. This expression takes into account that all bureaucrats exert eﬀort
and no producer evades taxes. Moreover, (7) highlights that in our model, taxation reduces
output through a particular general equilibrium mechanism; the government can raise taxes
only by hiring bureaucrats and bureaucrats themselves do not produce any output.
Finally, the following lemma is immediate and is stated without proof:
Lemma 4 Rich agents always vote for party R, i.e., for all j ∈ H, v
j
t = R, and poor producers
always vote for party P, i.e., for all j ∈ L and j/ ∈ Xt−1, v
j
t = P.
144.3 Equilibria under Permanent Democracy and Nondemocracy
Equilibria under permanent democracy and permanent nondemocracy are of interest as a com-
parison to our main political environment, which involves the society starting as nondemocratic
and then transitioning to democracy. The following results are straightforward:
Proposition 1 Under permanent democracy, there exists a unique MPE. In this equilibrium,
at each t ≥ 0 dt = P and the following policy vector is implemented at each t>0:
It =1 ,w t =
¡
1 − τD¢


















and τD is the unique solution to the maximization problem:
max
τ,G
(1 − τ)AL + G (9)
subject to
G =( 1 − n)τAH +[ n − π(τ)]τAL −
£
(1 − τ)AL + h
¤
π(τ) − K.
Proof. By Lemma 4, for all j ∈ L, v
j
t = P. Under permanent democracy, the poor can
vote and form the majority starting at t =0 ,t h u sdt = P for all t. Then the payoﬀ to the
decisive voter j0 ∈ L can be written as
V
j0
t =( 1− τ)At + Gt + βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗),
where again σ∗ is the optimal policy and βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗) is the discounted optimal continuation
value for this individual. The continuation value βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗) is unaﬀected by current policies,
thus the optimal policy can be determined as a solution to the following program:
max
τ,w,X,I,G
(1 − τ)AL + G (10)
subject to





,(1 − τ)AL + h
¾
≤ w
G ≤ (1 − n)τAH +[ n − X]τAL − wX − K
0 ≤ G.
It is evident that It = 1 relaxes the second constraint relative to It = 0, so will always be
chosen in all periods t ≥ 0. Moreover, there cannot be a solution in which any one of the
ﬁrst three constraints is slack (since this would allow an increase in G, raising the value of the
objective function), so we have X = π(τ)a n dw =m a x
©
h,(1 − τ)AL + h
ª
=( 1− τ)AL +h.
Substituting these equalities yields (9) for all periods where It = 1, i.e., for all t>0. Strict
convexity of π (·) then ensures that τD is uniquely deﬁned.
15Proposition 2 Under permanent nondemocracy, there exists a unique MPE. In this equilib-
rium, the following policy vector is implemented at each t>0:
It =1 ,w t =
¡
1 − τN¢
AL + h, Xt = π
¡
τN¢
,G t = GN ≡ 0,
and τN is the unique solution to the equation
£
(1 − τ)AL + h
¤
π (τ) − (1 − n)τAH − [n − π (τ)]τAL + K =0 . (11)
Proof. Under permanent nondemocracy, the rich retain political power forever. Then the
payoﬀ to the representative rich individual j0 ∈ H can be written as
V
j0
t =( 1− τ)AH + Gt + βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗),
where σ∗ is the optimal policy and βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗) is the discounted optimal continuation value for
this individual. Because the continuation value βV
j0
t+1 (σ∗) is unaﬀected by current policies,
the optimal policy can be determined as a solution to the following program:
max
τ,w,X,I,G
(1 − τ)AH + G (12)
subject to





,(1 − τ)AL + h
¾
≤ w
G ≤ (1 − n)τAH +[ n − X]τAL − wX − K
0 ≤ G.
It is again evident that It = 1 relaxes the second constraint relative to It =0 ,s ow i l la l w a y s
be chosen. Moreover, the ﬁrst three constraints must again hold as equalities, so we have
X = π (τ)a n dw =m a x
©
h,(1 − τ)AL + h
ª
=( 1− τ)AL+h. Substituting for these equalities
in program (12), it follows immediately that G = 0, and the strict convexity of π (·) again
ensures the uniqueness of the solution to (11).
The main conclusion from both of these benchmark political environments is that the
politically decisive agents choose a policy vector consistent with their own interests, and this
always involves an eﬃcient organization of the state, i.e., It =1f o ra l lt ≥ 0. There is no reason
to make the state ineﬃcient. Consequently, both consolidated democratic and nondemocratic
regimes involve I = 1. Moreover, in both regimes the capacity of the state is fully utilized
in the sense that constraint (2) holds as equality and the minimum number of bureaucrats
necessary to prevent tax evasion are employed.
It is straightforward to see that the unique solution
¡
τD,G D¢
in (9) involves τD > 0,
since infrastructure spending, K>0, has to be ﬁnanced (and for the same reason, τN > 0
16in Proposition 2). However, because raising further revenues involves the employment of
bureaucrats which is costly, it is possible that the solution to (9) involves GD =0 .I ft h i sw e r e
the case, there would be no diﬀerence between the political bliss points of poor and rich agents
given in Propositions 1 and 2 and thus no interesting political conﬂict. Therefore, throughout
we are more interested in the case where the following condition is satisﬁed:
Condition 1 The solution to (9) involves GD > 0.
It can be veriﬁed that if the gap between AH and AL is small and π0 (τ) is large, this
condition will be violated. Therefore, this condition imposes that there is a certain degree of
inequality in society and raising taxes is not excessively costly, so that the poor would like
a higher level of public good provision than the rich. When Condition 1 is satisﬁed, it also






and the size of
the bureaucracy is larger in permanent democracy than in permanent nondemocracy.
4.4 Political Equilibrium with Regime Change
We now look at the more interesting case with regime change–i.e., where at date t =0 ,t h e
rich are in power and from then on there will be elections. We start with a series of lemmas.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ts h o w st h a tw i t he ﬃcient state institutions, the rich will choose their political
bliss point as in Proposition 2:
Lemma 5 In an MPE, if dt = R and It =1 ,t h e nwt =
¡
1 − τN¢




Gt = GN ≡ 0,a n dτN is given by (11).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The next lemma establishes that the party representing the poor, party P, being elected to
oﬃce is an “absorbing state,” meaning that once the party of the poor is elected, the results
of Proposition 1 apply subsequently:
Lemma 6 If dt = P,t h e ndt0 = P for all t0 ≥ t, and we have the following equilibrium policy
vector at all dates t0 >t :
It =1 ,w t =
¡
1 − τD¢


















and τD is given by (9).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Once the party of the poor wins an election, they
will choose their preferred policy vector, which includes It =1 ,a n dg i v e na ne ﬃcient state,
17bureaucrats will have no reason to support the rich party and the poor will continue to win
elections in all future periods and the organization of the state will continue to be eﬃcient.
An eﬃcient organization of the state ensures that bureaucrats receive no rents and receive the
same payoﬀ as poor producers. Thus they will also support party P, and the political bliss
point of the poor will be implemented in all future periods. This lemma also implies that when
It−1 = 1–i.e., when the state is eﬃcient–the rich will not be able to win a majority. This
is related to the basic idea of our approach: the rich can only convince bureaucrats to vote
for their party by committing to giving them rents and this can only be achieved when the
organization of the state is ineﬃcient, i.e., It−1 =0 .
We next investigate whether or not the rich may be able to convince the bureaucrats to
vote for their party starting with It−1 = 0. Since there is no commitment to policies, the party
of the rich, when in power, will choose policies in line with its (the rich agents’) preferences.
The next lemma characterizes these policies starting with It−1 =0 .
Lemma 7 Suppose that It−1 =0 ,t h e nwt = h/q0. Moreover, if dt = R,t h e nGt = GE ≡ 0,
and if dt = P,t h e nGt = ˆ GD given by the solution to the following maximization program:
max
τ,G
(1 − τ)AL + G (14)
subject to
G =( 1 − n)τAH +[ n − π(τ)]τAL −
h
q0
π (τ) − K.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 3 As with the solution to the maximization problem (9), the solution to (14) may
involve ˆ GD = 0. With the same reasoning as there, when the level of inequality between the
rich and the poor is suﬃciently high, the solution to the program (14) will involve ˆ GD > 0.
The next lemma provides necessary conditions for the party of the rich to win an election
starting with It−1 =0 :
















where GD is given by (8), ˆ GD is given by (14), and τD is given by (9).
18Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 8 determines the conditions under which the bureaucrats will support party R
(a rich agent running for oﬃce) and will be numerous enough to give them the majority.
Condition (16) requires the size of the bureaucracy to be suﬃcient to give the majority to
party R when all bureaucrats vote with the rich. Nevertheless, n−1/2 may not be the actual
size of bureaucracy. In particular, at X = n − 1/2, the government budget may not balance.
To ensure that it does, we need to consider two cases separately.
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne τE as the tax rate that party R would choose as its unconstrained optimal
policy to ﬁnance the investment in infrastructure, K, given that bureaucratic wages are equal










τEAL + K =0 . (17)
In other words, τE balances the government budget when the minimum number of bureaucrats
necessary to avoid tax evasion, X = π
¡
τE¢
,a r ee m p l o y e d .
The ﬁr s tc a s ec o r r e s p o n d st ot h eo n ew h e r eπ
¡
τE¢
≥ n − 1/2, so that the unconstrained
optimal size of bureaucracy for party R is also suﬃcient to make sure that condition (16) is
satisﬁed and the rich have a majority.




In this case, the unconstrained optimal policy for the rich would not satisfy (16), and party
R cannot win the election with the minimum number of bureaucrats. Instead, party R can
w i na ne l e c t i o no n l yi fX ≥ n − 1/2, and with this larger size of bureaucracy, budget balance








− (1 − n)ˆ τEAH −
1
2
ˆ τEAL + K =0 . (18)
It can be veriﬁed that whenever n − 1/2 >π
¡
τE¢
,w ea l s oh a v eˆ τE >τ E, and whenever
n − 1/2 ≤ π
¡
τE¢
,ˆ τE ≤ τE. This implies that the size of the bureaucracy necessary for the
rich to form a winning coalition is the maximum of π
¡
τE¢
and n − 1/2, and correspondingly,




The results so far have provided the necessary conditions for the rich to be able to generate
suﬃcient votes from the bureaucrats to remain in power. It remains to check whether the rich
prefer to pursue this strategy and commit to an ineﬃcient state in order to maintain political
power in democracy. The following lemma answers this question:
Lemma 9 Suppose that condition (15) holds. Then the rich prefer to set It =0for all t if
19the following condition is satisﬁed:




or τE < ˆ τE,a n d
¡











where GD is given by (8), τD is given by (9), τE is given by (17), and ˆ τE is given by (18).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 4 If Condition 1 were not satisﬁed, the conditions in Lemma 9 could never be sat-
isﬁed. In particular, when Condition 1 does not hold, we have GD =0a n dτD = τE,s o
that neither part of condition (19) could hold. This is a direct consequence of the fact that a
signiﬁcant conﬂict in policies between the rich and the poor is necessary for the rich to set up
an ineﬃcient system of patronage politics.
Now putting all these lemmas together we obtain the main result of this section:
Proposition 3 Consider the political environment with emerging democracy. If conditions
(15) and (19) hold, then there exists a unique MPE. In this equilibrium, the rich elite choose

















where τE is given by (17) and ˆ τE is given by (18).
If, on the other hand, one or both of conditions (15) and (19) hold with the reverse inequal-
ity, the unique MPE involves It =1in the initial period, and for all t ≥ 1, dt = P and the






















and τD is given by (9).
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately from combining Lemma 8
and Lemma 9, which provide the conditions, summarized by (15) and (19), under which the
party of the rich, R, can convince the bureaucrats to vote for them, and this is desirable for
the rich relative to living under the rule of party P. When (15) or (19) does not hold, then
party P is in power and the second part of the proposition follows immediately from Lemma
6 and Proposition 1.
20Remark 5 Proposition 3 does not cover the case in which one of conditions (15) and (19)
holds as equality; in this case the MPE is no longer unique. It is straightforward to see that
in such a case, either the rich or the poor party could receive the majority of the votes, or the
rich could be indiﬀerent between maintaining an ineﬃcient and an eﬃcient state. We do not
describe the equilibrium in these cases to avoid repetition and to save space.
Remark 6 It can also be veriﬁed that the set of parameter values where It = 0 emerges as an
equilibrium in Proposition 3 is nonempty. A straightforward way of doing this is to consider
high values of β as in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 is our ﬁrst major result. It establishes the possibility that the rich elite,
who are in power temporarily at time t =0 ,m a yc h o o s ea ni n e ﬃcient state organization
and a large (ineﬃcient) bureaucracy as a way of credibly committing to providing rents to
bureaucrats. This enables them to create a majority coalition consisting of themselves and
the bureaucrats, and thus capture democratic politics. This coalition implements policies
that support low redistribution and low provision of public goods, but creates high rents for
bureaucrats. Perhaps more interestingly, after t = 1, even when the society is democratic, the
ineﬃcient state institutions persist and the rule of the rich continue. This is in spite of the
fact that at any date these ineﬃcient institutions can be reformed at no cost and made more
eﬃcient. The reasoning is related to the formation of the coalition between the rich and the
bureaucrats in the ﬁrst place. The rich realize that they will be able to maintain power only
by keeping an ineﬃcient state structure and creating suﬃcient rents for bureaucrats. If these
rents disappear, bureaucrats will ally themselves with the poor, since their net income will be
the same as the net income of poor producers (recall Lemmas 5 and 6). It is precisely the
presence of ineﬃcient state institutions creating rents for the bureaucrats that induces them to
support the policies of the rich. Recognizing this, when in power the rich choose to maintain
the ineﬃcient state structure. At the next date, the party representing the rich receives the
support of the bureaucrats and the rich; consequently, the rich remain in power and the cycle
continues. The model therefore generates a political economy theory for both the emergence
and the persistence of ineﬃcient state institutions.18
It is also noteworthy that even though taxes are lower in the equilibrium with ineﬃcient
state than they would have been under permanent democracy (recall Proposition 1 and Lemma
9), the size of the bureaucracy can be greater than under permanent democracy. This could be
the case when the rich elite hire more bureaucrats than necessary for preventing tax evasion
in order to create a majority in favor of the persistence of the ineﬃcient state–i.e., in the case
18T h en a t u r eo fp e r s i s t e n c eh e r ei sd i ﬀerent from the persistence of policies arising in Coate and Morris (1999),
Hassler et al. (2003), or Gomes and Jehiel (2005), because the focus is not on persistence of a certain set of





. In particular, note that bureaucracy will be more numerous under the

















Consequently, the rich not only choose an ineﬃcient state organization, but they also choose
overemployment of bureaucrats, in the sense that bureaucracy is now unnecessarily large and
the number of bureaucrats is strictly greater than that necessary for tax inspection. The
capture of democratic politics by the rich elite therefore creates an ineﬃcient state, with
poorly monitored and overpaid bureaucrats, and also leads to a situation in which the capacity
of the state is not fully utilized. These ineﬃciencies imply that the allocation of resources in
a captured democracy is worse than in a nondemocracy (or than in a perfectly functioning
democracy). Naturally, these ineﬃciencies have a political rationale, which is to increase the
number of bureaucrats that will vote for the party aligned with the rich, so that the rich can
maintain political power in the future.
Interestingly, because creating an ineﬃcient bureaucracy is more costly than creating an
eﬃcient one (which is smaller and gives bureaucrats no rents), the citizens are worse oﬀ in
a nonconsolidated (emerging) democracy, where they are taxed at rate max
©
τE,ˆ τEª
,t h a n




. Moreover, the rich are also worse oﬀ in this equilibrium than they would be in
a permanent nondemocracy, since they are paying higher wages to bureaucrats and possibly
employing an excessive number of them.
4.5 Comparative Statics
We next investigate the conditions under which the equilibrium involves the emergence and
persistence of ineﬃcient state institutions. The following proposition establishes that a certain
degree of inequality between the poor and the rich (i.e., a high level of AH/AL), a suﬃciently
high discount factor, β, and intermediate bureaucratic rents, (1 − q0)h/q0, are necessary for
the emergence of ineﬃcient state institutions.




and the function p(·). Holding all other parameters constant, we have:
1. there exists a>1 such that if AH/AL ≤ a, then the state is always eﬃcient, i.e., It =1 ;
2. there exist a0 > 1 and ¯ β ∈ (0,1) such that as long as AH/AL ≥ a0, β ≤ ¯ β implies It =1 ;




,t h e nIt =1 .
Proof. For the ﬁrst part simply recall Remark 4; inspection of the maximization problem
(9) immediately shows that as AL → AH, Condition 1 will be violated and the conditions in
(19) cannot hold. Then the result follows from Lemma 9 and Proposition 3.
For the second part, recall from Remark 3 that some minimal level of inequality, say
AH/AL ≥ a0, is necessary for ˆ GD > 0. Suppose this is the case. From Proposition 3, condition
(15) is necessary for It =0 . S i n c e ˆ GD > 0, there exists β0 ∈ (0,1) such that (1 − q0)h/q0 =
β0 ˆ GD/(1 − β0). Since the sum of the other terms on the right hand side of (15) is positive,
this implies that there exists ¯ β<β 0 such that for all β ≤ ¯ β (15) will be violated and thus
It =1 .
For the third part, note that bureaucratic rents are equal to h/q0−h =( 1− q0)h/q0,w h i c h
needs to be greater than or equal to the right hand side of (15). Let this right hand side be
denoted by θ (and note that θ > 0). If (1 − q0)h/q0 <θ , then (15) will be violated and It =1 .
This implies that we need (1 − q0)h/q0 ≥ θ > 0. Next observe from (17) that there exists a
value of (1 − q0)h/q0,s a yθ0, such that ˆ τE =1 . I ti se v i d e n tt h a tw h e nˆ τE = 1, condition
(19) cannot be satisﬁed, thus It =1 .T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o rIt =0 ,w en e e dh/q0 ≤ θ0 and thus
(1 − q0)h/q0 ≤ θ.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition implies that a certain level of inequality is necessary for
the emergence of an ineﬃcient state. This is intuitive; with limited inequality, democracy
will not be redistributive and it will not be worthwhile for the rich to set up an ineﬃcient
bureaucracy in order to keep the poor away from power. The second part implies that the
high discount factor is also necessary for the emergence of the ineﬃcient state. This follows
because bureaucrats vote for party R as an “investment”, that is, to obtain higher returns in
the future. Instead, if they deviate and vote for party P, in the current period they receive
both the same high wages (since It = 0) and the positive level of public good provided by party
P, ˆ GD > 0. If their discount factor were very small, it would be impossible for rich agents
to convince bureaucrats to support their party.19 Finally, the third part of the proposition
implies that bureaucratic rents need to take intermediate values. If bureaucratic rents are very
small, bureaucrats would not support the party of the rich. If they are very large, it becomes
prohibitively costly for the rich to control democratic politics.
While Proposition 4 shows that a certain degree of inequality is necessary for It =0 ,i td o e s
not establish that inequality has a monotonic eﬀect on the likelihood of an ineﬃcient state.
The next proposition establishes this result under somewhat more restrictive assumptions.
19Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) also obtain the result that higher discount factors
may lead to greater ineﬃciencies. However, in these models the source of ineﬃciency is very diﬀerent. In
particular, ineﬃcient political equilibria arise when pivotal agents–elites or rulers–are suﬃciently patient and
thus take ineﬃcient actions in order to secure their future political survival.
23In this proposition, by greater inequality we mean a mean-preserving spread of the income
distribution in the economy, i.e., a simultaneous increase in AH and decrease in AL such that
mean income, Y =( 1− n)AH + nAL remains constant.




< 1. Then there exists ˜ β ∈ (0,1) such that for all β ≥ ˜ β, greater inequality makes
the ineﬃcient state equilibrium, i.e., It =0 ,m o r el i k e l y .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 7 The condition that π(τ) is log-concave is not very restrictive. For example, any
p(x) that takes the power function form, i.e., p(x)=P0xα for P0 > 0a n dα ∈ (0,1), satisﬁes
this condition. The condition that τD < 1 − π
¡
τD¢
< 1 is also natural; if this condition were
violated, we would have that the utility of the poor in democracy
¡
1 − τD¢
AL +GD would be
non-increasing in AL (see the Appendix).
In addition to generalizing the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4, this result implies that taxes (and
public spending) can be higher in more equal societies, because unequal societies are more likely
to create ineﬃcient bureaucracies to limit taxation and public spending. This result therefore
presents an alternative explanation to the often-discussed negative cross-sectional correlation
between inequality and redistribution (e.g. Perotti, 1996, B´ enabou, 2000).
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we discuss a number of extensions of our benchmark model. First, we allow
bureaucrats to be ﬁred when they are caught shirking, so that the incentive compatibility con-
straint of bureaucrats is forward-looking and takes into account the rents that a bureaucrat
will lose when he gets caught not exerting eﬀort. Second, we allow a richer political environ-
ment where each individual can run for oﬃce (form a party) as a citizen-candidate, so that
bureaucrats can also form their own party and compete against the party of the poor and the
rich. Third, we consider the case where the moral hazard problem of bureaucrats arises from
their temptation to accept bribes that might be oﬀered by taxpayers.
5.1 Equilibrium When Bureaucrats Can Be Fired
The main result of the previous section, Proposition 3, was derived under the assumption
that bureaucrats cannot be ﬁred when they are caught shirking. This simpliﬁed the analysis
by enabling us to write the incentive compatibility constraint of bureaucrats in the form of
condition (5). As discussed in Remark 1 this was mainly for expositional reasons. We now
allow bureaucrats to be ﬁred when they are caught shirking. It is clear that from the viewpoint
24of discouraging shirking, a contract which commits to ﬁring bureaucrats when they are caught
shirking is optimal. The discussion in Remark 1 establishes that, in a stationary equilibrium,
the incentive compatibility constraint of bureaucrats, the equivalent of (5), in this case, would
be:
ˆ w ≥ β (1 − ˆ τ)AL +
(1 − β (1 − ˆ q))h
ˆ q
. (20)
Given this condition, all of the results from the previous section apply with appropriate mod-
iﬁcations. In particular we have (proof omitted):
Lemma 10 Consider the environment where bureaucrats can be ﬁred for shirking. Then in
any MPE, if dt = R and It−1 =0 ,w eh a v ewt = β
¡
1 − ˜ τE¢
AL +( 1− β (1 − q0))h/q0 and





1 − ˜ τE¢
AL +
(1 − β (1 − q0))h
q0
¸
− (1 − n)˜ τEAH − [n − λm]˜ τEAL + K = 0 (21)








Moreover, we have the following generalization of Lemma 9 (proof omitted):
Lemma 11 Consider the environment where bureaucrats can be ﬁred for shirking. Then in
any MPE, the rich will win the election at time t only if there is an ineﬃcient state, i.e.,
It−1 =0 ; if bureaucrats prefer to support the party of the rich, i.e., if
β
¡
1 − ˜ τE¢
AL +









and if the rich-bureaucrat coalition has the majority, i.e., if








(1 − τ)AL + G
subject to




1 − ˜ τE¢




π (τ) − K.
Furthermore, the rich prefer this equilibrium and choose It =0at time t only if
¡
τD − ˜ τE¢
AH >G D. (24)
These two lemmas give the following analogue to Proposition 3:
25Proposition 6 Consider the political environment with emerging democracy and suppose that
bureaucrats can be ﬁred if caught shirking. Then, if conditions (22) and (24) hold, the unique
MPE is one in which the rich elite choose It =0in the initial period and for all t thereafter,
the rich party always remains in power and the following policies are implemented at all dates:
wt = β
¡
1 − ˜ τE¢







, Gt = GE ≡ 0,a n d
τt =˜ τE,w h e r e˜ τE is given by (21).
If one or both of conditions (22) and (24) hold with the reverse inequality, the unique MPE




AL + h, Xt = π
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τD¢













,a n dτD as given by (9).
Proof. Combining Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 provides the conditions, (22) and (24),
under which the party of the rich, R, can convince the bureaucrats to vote for them, and this
is desirable for the rich relative to living under the rule of party P. When instead (22) or (24),
or both, do not hold, then party P is in power and the second part of the proposition follows
immediately from Lemma 6 and Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the results in Proposition 3 generalize to the environment
where bureaucrats can be ﬁred if caught shirking. One important diﬀerence is worth noting,
however. In our main analysis, Proposition 4 showed that a higher discount factor, β,m a k e s
the emergence of an ineﬃcient state more likely. Instead, when bureaucrats can be ﬁred,
the relationship between the discount factor and the emergence of ineﬃcient states is more
complex. Higher β again increases the importance that bureaucrats attach to future rents, but
it also reduces the level of rents, because being ﬁred from bureaucracy becomes more costly.
5.2 Political Equilibrium Citizen-Candidates
The previous analysis limited the political system under democracy to a two-party competition
between P and R, the two parties representing the interests of the poor and the rich. We
justiﬁed this by assuming that bureaucrats are not allowed to run for oﬃce. Even if bureaucrats
are not allowed to run for oﬃce, it is possible that a party representing their interest might
form. If such a party forms, bureaucrats may vote for that party, and the coalition between
the rich and the bureaucrats, choosing low public good provision and low taxes, may not
materialize. We now investigate whether in general we expect this to be the case or not when
multiple parties can enter the political system.
We follow Osborne and Slivinski’s (1996) and Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen-candidate
model, where each individual agent can run as a candidate and upon election chooses his most-
preferred policy vector. This setup is quite similar to the one we used above, since parties could
not make credible policy promises and the policy vector was chosen after a politician (party)
26was elected oﬃce. The problem with the citizen-candidate models in general is that when more
than two parties compete, coordination among the citizens regarding which party has a chance
to win the election is important for the outcomes and typically lead to multiple equilibria in the
voting stage. To avoid these problems, we consider the following modiﬁcation of the standard
citizen-candidate model:
1. Each individual can decide to form a party and run for oﬃce, and this has cost ε,w h i c h
is taken to be small (in particular, we will consider the case where ε ↓ 0). Individuals derive no
utility from coming to power, but simply beneﬁt from being in power by implementing policies
that are in line with their interests.
2. Given all parties that are running for oﬃce, individuals vote using ballots with trans-
ferable votes, meaning that each individual ranks all parties in strict order of preference. In
particular, the vote of individual j can be represented as v
j
t = i1i2i3,w h e r ei1,i 2 and i3 are
distinct elements of {R,P,B},e . g . ,v
j
t = RBP.I nt h eﬁrst stage, parties are allocated votes
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst preferences of the voters. Then as is standard with this type of voting
rule, the party that gets the lowest fraction of votes is eliminated, and its votes are allocated
to the second-ranked choice of the voters who had originally voted for this party. This process
continues until one of the parties has a majority.
To simplify the discussion, in this section we assume that bureaucrats cannot be ﬁred if
caught shirking, so the incentive compatibility constraint for bureaucrats is given by (5)–
though this has no eﬀect on any of the results in the section.
Given this setup, the notion of Markov Perfect Equilibrium is modiﬁed accordingly. The
analysis in this case is still tractable thanks to the following series of lemmas:
Lemma 12 Truthful ranking is a weakly dominant strategy for each individual.
Proof. The transferable votes imply that at any stage of the elimination process, either an
individual is pivotal, has a choice between two options, and thus is better oﬀ ranking his more
preferred outcome above a less preferred outcome. Alternatively, the individual is not pivotal,
any choice is a best response. This establishes that truthful ranking is weakly dominant.
Lemma 13 In any MPE, there will never be more than one party operated by an individual
of the same group. Thus the maximum number of parties is three.
Proof. The result follows since the policies chosen by two parties run by two poor agents
(or two rich agent or two bureaucrats) will be identical. Moreover, from Lemma 12, each
agent ranks parties truthfully, thus the addition of a new party will not change the equilibrium
probability that a party run by a poor individual, a rich individual or a bureaucrat wins the
election. Thus conditional on a party run by a poor agent existing, there is no point for any
other poor agent to incur the cost ε>0a n df o r map a r t y .
27Lemma 13 then enables us to simply look at the (truthful) preference ranking of each
individual over at three parties {P,R,B}, corresponding to parties run by a poor individual,
a rich individual and a bureaucrat (there is no source of confusion in this notation, since
there can at most be one party run by a poor agent, one run by a rich agent, and one run
by a bureaucrat). To do this, we need to know the policies that will be chosen by the three
types of parties. Our previous analysis already establishes the policies that will be chosen by
parties P and R (provided that party R is trying to come to oﬃce by attracting the votes
of bureaucrats). We therefore only need to look at the policy choice of a party run by a
bureaucrat. The following lemma characterizes this choice:
Lemma 14 Taking future election results as given, the party dt = B would choose the following









wB =a r g m a x
τ,w w
subject to
min{Xt−1,π(τ)}w + K ≤ (1 − n)τAH +[ n − min{Xt−1,π(τ)}]τAL.
Proof. This immediately follows by writing the program to maximize the return to a










,(1 − τ)AL + h
¾
≤ w
G ≤ (1 − n)τAH +[ n − X]τAL − wX − K
0 ≤ G.
Intuitively, bureaucrats would maximize their wages subject to the government budget
constraint. Notice that Lemma 14 applies taking the results of future elections as given. If the
current bureaucratic government could inﬂuence the outcome of future elections, this could





, which would (from the
government budget constraint) make this policy vector even less attractive to poor and rich
agents.
The key to the results in this section is the following observation: because a bureaucratic
government will maximize wages paid to bureaucrats (and provide no public goods), it yields
28a lower utility to poor agents than a rich government would do. As a result, we will see that a
bureaucratic government will never get elected. To show this more formally, let us denote the
vote of individual j at time t by v
j
t, which is a ranking over {P,R,B}. For example, v
j
t = PRB
means that the individual ranks the poor party ﬁrst, the rich party second in the bureaucratic
party last.
We now have the following rankings for individuals:
Lemma 15 If j ∈ H,t h e nv
j
t = RPB.
If j ∈ L and j/ ∈ X,t h e nv
j
t = PRB.
If j ∈ X,t h e nv
j
t = BRP.
Proof. We have already established that voters rank parties truthfully, so that all voters
rank their own party ﬁrst. Assuming that party R implements the policy characterized in
Proposition (3) to attract the bureaucrats, we have that bureaucrats indeed prefer the rich to
the poor as second choice; hence, if j ∈ X,t h e nv
j
t = BRP. Moreover, the poor prefer the rich
to the bureaucrats since neither of them oﬀers any public good, but the rich tax less than the
bureaucrats. This follows since both the rich and the bureaucrats choose to ﬁnance K,a n d
party B chooses a wage wB for bureaucrats higher than the wage h/q0 that the bureaucrats
get if the rich are in power. Hence, if j ∈ L and j/ ∈ X,t h e nv
j
t = PRB. Finally, the second
choice of the rich is for the poor, both because the poor would provide a positive amount of
the public good rather than zero as the bureaucrats would, and because the poor would tax
less then the bureaucrats given that the marginal cost of taxation for the poor is positive, and




Lemma 15 implies that the poor, when they cannot have a majority by themselves, will
support the rich party, thus as long as the bureaucrats are not in majority by themselves, i.e.,
Xt < 1/2 and the rich pursue the policy in Proposition 3, we will have dt = R.T h i si m p l i e s
that the rich can continue to use same political strategies as in the previous section to control
political decision-making in democracy.
Now combining the previous lemmas, we have the following proposition, which mirrors
Proposition 3.
Proposition 7 Consider the political environment with emerging democracy and free political




1/2,w h e r eτE is deﬁned by (17) above. Then, in any MPE of the citizen-candidate political
game, only a party run by a rich agent is active. The unique equilibrium policy vector is given











for all t,w h e r eˆ τE is given by (18).




1/2,w h e r eτD is deﬁned by (9), then the unique MPE involves only a party run by a poor
agent is active, and the unique equilibrium policy vector involves It =1for all t,a n df o ra l l
t ≥ 1, wt =
¡
1 − τD¢
AL +h, Xt = π
¡
τD¢














Proof. This proposition can be proved by backward induction. First, suppose that con-
ditions (15) and (19) hold. Then, from Lemma 15, when X<1/2, the bureaucratic party
will never win an election. The assumption that X−1 = ∅ implies that in the initial period
X−1 < 1/2, and the assumption that π
¡
τE¢
< 1/2 ensure that X<1/2 continues to be the
case when the rich party is in power. Therefore, when the rich party is in power, no bureau-
crat incurs the cost ε ↓ 0 to form a party, and thus bureaucrats support party R by the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 3. Next, knowing that bureaucrats support party R,
no poor agent incurs the cost ε ↓ 0 to compete against party R as long as party R is choosing
the policy in Proposition 3 (if they did deviate from this policy, then a poor party can win an
election, and thus a poor agent will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to enter and form a party since ε ↓ 0;
thus despite the fact that party P would not be running, party R has to adopt the same policy
vector as in Proposition 3). Finally, since ε ↓ 0, it cannot be an equilibrium for no rich agents
to form a party, since such a party would create strictly positive gains for each rich agent, and
the cost of creating a party is ε ↓ 0.
The proof of the cases where one or both of conditions (15) and (19) hold with the reverse
inequality is similar.
This proposition therefore shows that our main results regarding the use of an ineﬃcient
state as a way by the rich elite to control the democratic political process continue to apply
even when the political structure is enriched to allow free entry by citizen-candidates of any
occupation. The additional insights that is interesting in this case is that when the poor
producers prefer to support the party of the rich, R, rather than the party of the bureaucrats,
B, since the latter would impose high taxes and provide no public goods (spending all the
proceeds on bureaucratic wages).
5.3 Bureaucratic Corruption
We now brieﬂy discuss an extension of our basic model in which the moral hazard problem on
the side of bureaucrats is not related to their eﬀort, but to whether or not they accept bribes
from producers evading taxes. This source of moral hazard problem is arguably as important
as the eﬀort choice of bureaucrats. Moreover, we will see below that it leads to an interesting
pattern of de facto regressive taxation as a result of successful patronage politics by the rich
elite.
30The economic and political environment is similar to the baseline version of the model with
a two-party system. The only diﬀerence is that the bureaucrats no longer have an eﬀort choice.
Instead, producers that have evaded taxes can pay a bribe b ≥ 0 to the bureaucrat inspecting
them in order to avoid paying taxes.
Similar to the baseline model, we allow for two levels of monitoring eﬃciency, described by
the state variable It ∈ {0,1}.W h e nI =1 ,t h e r ei sa ne ﬃcient organization of the state and
corruption is detected with probability q(I =1 )=1 . W h e nI = 0, the state organization is
ineﬃcient and corruption is detected with probability q(I =0 )=q0 < 1. We make a number of
assumptions to simplify the exposition. First, we assume that a bureaucrat caught accepting
bribes loses his wage and the bribe, but the punishment is limited to only one period; the
producer paying the bribes loses the bribe but receives no other punishment. Second, all bribe
payments and other income conﬁscated are lost and thus do not enter the government budget
constraint. Third, we assume that after matching with a bureaucrat, the producer has all the
bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it bribe oﬀer to the bureaucrat. All of these
assumptions can be relaxed without changing our main results.
Finally, we assume that each bureaucrat can be matched with at most one producer and
that, for the relevant part of the parameter values, p(x) <x /(1 − x). Note that the function
p(x)i sc o n c a v ew h i l ex/(1 − x) is convex and both are equal to zero for x =0 . T h e r e f o r e ,
there is a range for x ∈ [0,x m] such that p(x) ≥ x/(1 − x). We assume that xm is lower than
the minimum size of the bureaucracy necessary to ﬁnance the infrastructure K,w h i c he n s u r e s
that the region where p(x) ≥ x/(1 − x) is irrelevant for the equilibrium.
L e tu ss t a r tw i t ht h ec a s ew h e r et h es t a t ei si n e ﬃcient so that q = q0 and characterize the
most preferred policies of the rich. The participation constraint of the bureaucrat is slightly
diﬀerent from (6), since there is no cost of eﬀort. It requires that
wt ≥ (1 − τt)AL. (25)
The incentive compatibility constraint for bureaucrats (5) is now replaced by the following
“no bribe constraint”:
wt ≥ (1 − q0)(wt + bt), (26)
where bt is the bribe oﬀered to the bureaucrat by a producer. Intuitively, the right hand
side of (26) represents the expected return of a bureaucrat that accepts a bribe bt,g i v e nb y
the sum of the wage and the bribe, weighted by the probability of not being detected. If
condition (26) does not hold, it is not possible to prevent the corruption of bureaucrats by
producers.20 Condition (26) implies that, given the public sector wage wt, only bribes higher
20Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) provide evidence that higher public sector wages relative to manufac-
turing wages reduce the scope for the corruption of the public administration.





In what follows, we drop time subscripts to simplify notation. When in power, the rich
maximize their per-period utility with respect to τ, w, X, G, and the decision variable z ∈
{0,1}, which, as before, designates their decision of whether to pay taxes. The expected utility
of the rich when they do not pay taxes is







+[ 1− p(x)]AH + G. (28)
Expression (28) incorporates the following facts: (i) producers are inspected by a bureaucrat
with probability p(x); (ii) bribing is detected with probability q0; (iii) the bribe oﬀered by the
rich to bureaucrats is equal to the lowest acceptable bribe b(w) ≡ q0w/(1 − q0)d e ﬁned in
(27); and (iv) when inspected, the income of a rich producer is max
©
AH − q0w/(1 − q0),0
ª
.








+[ 1− p(x)]AL ≤ (1 − τ)AL, (29)
xw + G + K ≤ (n − x)τAL, (30)
and subject to the participation constraint (25) of the bureaucrats. Constraint (29) requires
that the poor prefer to pay taxes to tax evasion. This constraint has to be satisﬁed since at
least one class must pay taxes, otherwise it would not be possible to ﬁnance the infrastructure
investment, K (this is because, if the poor prefer to evade taxes, the rich will do so a fortiori).
Constraint (30) implies that the government budget constraint is satisﬁed, taking account of
the fact that public revenues come from the taxation of the poor only.
Lemma 16 Suppose that the rich prefer not to pay taxes. Then their optimal policies involve
˜ wE ≡ (1 − q0)AL/q0, (31)
p(x)=τ, (32)
and ˜ GE =0for some τ ∈ [0,1].
Proof. See Appendix A.
We will next show that given (31) and (32), the equilibrium involves tax evasion by the
rich. Substituting for these expressions, we obtain the utility of the rich when they evade taxes
as




32In contrast, when a rich agent pays the tax rate (while all others evade taxes) his utility
would be
uH (z =1 ) = ( 1− τ)AH, (34)




= uH (z =0 ).
Next let ˘ τE denote the unique value of τ satisfying the government budget constraint (30),
at the candidate equilibrium with the rich agents evading taxes
π
¡
˘ τE¢ 1 − q0
q0






where π(·) is again deﬁn e di n( 1 ) .
As in the main analysis, there are two cases to consider depending on whether n − π
¡
˘ τE¢
is greater than or less than 1/2. Here we simplify the analysis by focusing on the case where
there are suﬃciently many bureaucrats so that, together with the rich, they are the absolute
majority, i.e., n − π
¡
˘ τE¢
≤ 1/2. The converse case with n − π
¡
˘ τE¢
> 1/2 necessitates that
t h er i c hc r e a t ea ni n e ﬃciently large bureaucracy in order to win the election. Since the results
in this case are again similar, we do not discuss them in this extension.
Lemmas 5 and 6 continue apply in this modiﬁed environment. In particular, if bureaucrats
ever vote for the poor, there is a permanent transition to an equilibrium with an eﬃcient state
with the poor in power within one period from the election. The following lemma characterizes
the policy vector that the poor would implement in the period they win the election when the
existing organization of the state is ineﬃcient and also the policy vector that they will choose
when the state is eﬃcient.
Lemma 17 Suppose that dt = P and consider the following maximization program:
max
τ,G,w
(1 − τ)AL + G
subject to
















+[ 1− p(π (τ))]AH ≤ (1 − τ)AH and z =1 ,o rz =0 ,
and (1 − τ)AL ≤ w,w h e r ez ∈ {0,1} denotes the decision of the rich whether to pay taxes.
Then the policy vector that the poor would choose when It−1 =0 , τt =ˆ τD, Gt = ˆ GD, wt =ˆ wD,
is given by the solution to this program when q(I)=q0. The policy vector that the poor would
choose when It−1 =1 ,i sg i v e nb yτt = ˘ τD, Gt = ˘ GD, w = ˘ wD,w h e nq(I)=1and the ﬁrst
term in the last two inequalities is equal to zero.
33The penultimate inequality in the maximization program in this lemma represents the “no
tax evasion” constraint for the poor, while the last constraint allows the program to choose
whether or not to satisfy the no tax evasion constraint of the rich. Notice that if this last
constraint is satisﬁed, the penultimate one will also be satisﬁed automatically (since AH >A L).
When It−1 = 1 and the state is eﬃcient, bribery is not possible and the max term in the last
two inequalities becomes zero.
The next two lemmas are the analogues of Lemmas 8 and 9 and determine the conditions
under which the bureaucrats are willing to vote for the rich, and the rich prefer the allocation
in which they are in power to the one in which the poor are in power. Since their proofs are
similar to those of Lemmas 8 and 9, they are omitted.




AL > (1 − β)
³




1 − ˘ τD¢
AL + ˘ GD
i
, (36)
where ˆ wD, ˆ GD, ˘ τD and ˘ GD are deﬁned in Lemma 17.
Condition (36) implies that the bureaucrats prefer to be in an ineﬃcient state under the
rule of the rich, given the “wage policy” that is optimal for the rich, rather than voting for the
poor. In fact, if they vote for the rich, the bureaucrats obtain a wage equal to (1 − q0)AL/q0,
whereas if they vote for the poor, they obtain a wage of ˆ wD and public with provision of ˆ GD
for one period (while the state is ineﬃcient), and subsequently a payoﬀ equal to the payoﬀ of
the poor under an eﬃcient state.
Lemma 19 Suppose that condition (36) holds. Then, the rich prefer to set It =0for all t if
the following condition is satisﬁed
h¡
1 − ˘ τD¢
















where ˘ τD and ˘ GD are deﬁned in Lemma 17, and ˘ τE is given by (35).
Proof. It is immediate that (37) is suﬃcient to ensure that the rich prefer to be in power






to living under democracy with taxes and public good provision given
by ˘ τD and ˘ GD as in Lemma 17.
Condition (37) states that the payoﬀ to the rich when the state is eﬃcient (and the poor
are in power) is lower than the expected payoﬀ that they get when the state is ineﬃcient (and
they are in power). The latter payoﬀ reﬂects the following facts: only the poor pay taxes, tax





= ˘ τE,a n dt h er i c ho ﬀer a bribe equal to AL
to the bureaucrat inspecting them.
34The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium with bureaucratic corruption. Since
its proof follows that of Proposition 3 closely, it is omitted.
Proposition 8 Consider the political environment with emerging democracy. Then, if con-
ditions (36) and (37) hold, the unique MPE is one in which the rich elite choose It =0in
the initial period and for all t thereafter, the rich party R always remains in power and the
following policies are implemented at all dates:
wt =˜ wE ≡
1 − q0
q0




Gt = ˜ GE ≡ 0,a n dτt = ˘ τE,
where ˘ τE is given by (35). Moreover, only the poor pay taxes, while the rich evade taxes and
pay a bribe equal to b = AL when inspected.
If, on the other hand, one or both of conditions (36) and (37) hold with the reverse inequal-
i t y ,t h eu n i q u eM P Ei n v o l v e sIt =1for all t,a n df o ra l lt ≥ 1, dt = P and the unique policy
vector is
wt = ˘ wD ≡
¡
1 − ˘ τD¢
















where ˘ τD and ˘ GD are deﬁned in Lemma 17.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows from Lemmas 16-19. The only part that
remains to be proved is that when one or both of conditions (36) and (37) hold with the reverse
inequality, the poor will be in power. To see this, note that these conditions (with the reverse
inequality) are suﬃcient for the rich to prefer democracy to setting up an ineﬃcient state and
evading taxes. Moreover, as before, if the state is eﬃcient (i.e., It−1 = 1), the poor will be in
power. Therefore, we only have to show that the rich elite would not prefer an ineﬃcient state
and no tax evasion. This is straightforward since to prevent tax evasion by themselves, the
rich would have to set a higher tax rate than ˘ τE, since the “no tax evasion constraint” for the








+[ 1− p(π(τ))]AH ≤ (1 − τ)AH.
At ˘ τE,t h i sc o n s t r a i n ti sv i o l a t e d( s i n c ei ti ss a t i s ﬁed as equality for AL). Thus, this con-
s t r a i n tw i l lb es a t i s ﬁed at some tax rate τ0 > ˘ τE, which would give a per-period utility of
















AH. Therefore, the rich are always better oﬀ evading taxes when in power.
This establishes that conditions (36) and (37) holding with reverse inequality are suﬃcient for
the equilibrium with the poor in power to emerge.
35The most interesting result in Proposition 8 is that, when they are able to capture demo-
cratic politics, the rich do not pay any taxes at all. Instead, they (sometimes) pay bribes
equal to the tax burden on poor agents, AL. This implies that patronage politics turns de jure
proportional taxation into a de facto regressive one. In other words, when the rich elite are
a b l et os e tu pa ni n e ﬃcient state and receive the support of bureaucrats, they are not only able
to limit redistribution and public good provision, but they are also able to shift most of the
burden of taxation to the poor. Consequently, the tax rate faced by the poor may be higher
when corruption is possible than in the baseline model where both rich and poor pay taxes.
6 An Empirical Implication and Some Evidence
A distinctive empirical implication of our model is that democracies where relative wages of
bureaucrats are high should provide fewer public goods. This is because, all else equal, bureau-
crats are paid higher relative wages when the elite use patronage politics to limit redistribution
and public good provision. In contrast, a naive intuition may suggest that relative wages of
bureaucrats and public good provision should be correlated positively, either because when
there is greater provision of public goods, more activities are entrusted to bureaucrats and
they need to be paid more, or because countries with a greater willingness to tax will spend
more both on public employment and on public good provision.21
We next look at the cross-country correlation between the relative wages of bureaucrats
and public good provision among democracies. Our measure of the relative wage of bureau-
crats is average wage of public-sector employees relative to GDP per capita from World Bank
for 1991-2000. Our main measure of public good provision is total (central) government ex-
penditure as a fraction of GDP for 1990-1998, and we also look at social services and welfare
spending as a fraction of GDP as an alternative dependent variable.22 Both of these variables
are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (see the details in the Appendix). To
focus on democracies, we limit the sample to countries with an average Polity score greater
than or equal to 5 over the period 1990-1998, which corresponds to “stable democracies” (see
Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Our baseline sample contains 51 observations. Figure 1 shows
the correlation between the relative wages of bureaucrats and government expenditure share of
GDP. A strong negative relationship is visible in the ﬁgure, with most European countries hav-
ing lower relative wages for bureaucrats and government expenditures than in Latin American
21An alternative intuition may be that, with a ﬁxed government budget, higher public sector wages would
force the government to reduce the rest of public good expenditures. In practice, there is considerable variation
in the level of government budgets, and we will see below that same results apply with a measure of spending
on social services and welfare.
22We choose the total government expenditure as our main measure, both because we have more observations
on this variable and also because the alternative, social services and welfare spending share of GDP, is heavily
inﬂuenced by the age structure of the population. See below.
36and Asian countries (there are few African countries in our sample).
The regression corresponding to Figure 1 is shown in column 1 of Table 1, with the ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. The correlation between relative bureaucratic wages and
government expenditure share of GDP is statistically highly signiﬁcant, with a t-statistic of
approximately 5. Column 2 of the table controls for GDP per capita. Richer countries spend
more on public goods and income per capita is also correlated with relative bureaucratic wages.
This regression shows that log income per capita is indeed signiﬁcant, but the relationship be-
tween relative bureaucratic wages and government expenditures remains strong (the coeﬃcient
declines from -4.96 to -3.63, which continues to be signiﬁcant at less than 1%). Column 3 also
controls for the Polity democracy score, which is insigniﬁcant and has little eﬀect on the coef-
ﬁcient of the relative wage of bureaucrats. Figure 2 shows the conditional correlation between
relative bureaucratic wage and government expenditure share of GDP corresponding to column
3 of Table 1. The same negative relationship as in Figure 1 is again visible.
Column 4 controls for the age structure of the population, in particular the fraction of
the population between the ages of 15-64 and the fraction over the age of 65. We expect
the age structure of the population to have a direct eﬀect on Social Security spending and
thus also on total government expenditures. The results in column 4 show that controlling for
the age structure variables signiﬁcantly reduces both the coeﬃcient estimate of the relative
bureaucratic wage and the standard errors. The coeﬃcient estimate is now -1.82, with a
standard error of 0.85, which is still signiﬁcant at 5%.
Columns 5-8 repeat the same regressions using social services and welfare spending as a
percentage of GDP as the dependent variable. The results are similar to those for government
expenditure and typically stronger, except when we control for the age structure variables. In
particular, in columns 5-8, relative bureaucratic wage is signiﬁcant at less than 1%. Once we
include the controls for the age structure of the population, however, the relationship between
the relative bureaucratic wage and social services and welfare spending is no longer signiﬁcant;
the coeﬃcient estimate declines signiﬁcantly and the standard error doubles. This result might
reﬂect the fact that social services and welfare spending are closely related to the age structure
of the population and there is little cross-sectional variation left once we control for the age
structure variables.
In addition to the results shown in Table 1, we have also experimented with including
“semi-stable” democracies (those with Polity scores between 0 and 5). The results are similar
but slightly weaker. The results are also similar when we construct the sample using Freedom
House measures of political and civil rights. We also checked the robustness of the results to
various other controls. The results are broadly similar when we control for the legal origin of
the country, for parliamentary versus presidential systems, for majoritarian versus proportional
democracies, and for the age of democracy. Nevertheless, the results are signiﬁcantly weakened
37or disappear when we control for a full set of continent dummies. This is not entirely surprising,
since, as Figures 1 and 2 show, the results reﬂect the contrast of European countries to Latin
American and Asian countries.
Overall, it appears that there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between government
expenditure and the relative wages of bureaucrats, which becomes weaker when we control
for the age structure of the population and for continent dummies. While this cross-country
correlation is not as robust as we would like it to be, it is nonetheless encouraging for our
approach, since the negative relationship between relative wages of bureaucrats and government
expenditure is a counter-intuitive implication of our model and a naive intuition would have
suggested the opposite relationship between these two variables.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Ineﬃciencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as an important
factor in retarding economic development. Many sociological accounts of comparative devel-
opment emphasize the role of state capacity (or lack thereof) in explaining why some societies
are able to industrialize and modernize (e.g., Evans, 1995, Migdal, 1988). In addition, inef-
ﬁcient state organizations appear to coincide with limited amounts of public good provision
and redistribution towards the poor. Existing approaches do not address the question of why
certain societies choose or end up with such ineﬃcient organizations and do not clarify the
relationship between ineﬃcient state organizations and limited redistribution.
We presented a simple theory of the emergence and persistence of ineﬃcient states, in which
the organization of the public bureaucracy is manipulated by the rich elite in order to inﬂuence
redistributive politics. In particular, by instituting an ineﬃcient state structure, the elite are
able to use patronage and capture democratic politics. This enables them to limit the extent of
redistribution and public good provision. Captured democracies not only limit redistribution,
but also create a number of major distortions: the structure of the state is ineﬃcient, there is
too little public good provision and there may be overemployment of bureaucrats.
We also showed that an ineﬃcient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist
over time. Intuitively, an ineﬃcient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than
w o u l da ne ﬃcient state structure. When the median (poor) agent comes to power in democracy,
he will reform the structure of the state to make it more eﬃcient so that the higher taxes can
be collected at lower cost (especially in terms of lower rents for bureaucrats). Anticipating
this, when the organization of the state is ineﬃcient, bureaucrats support the rich, who set
lower taxes but pay high wages to bureaucrats. In order to generate enough political support,
the coalition of the rich and the bureaucrats may not only choose an ineﬃcient organization of
the state, but they may further expand the size of bureaucracy so as to gain additional votes.
38The model shows that an equilibrium with an ineﬃcient state is more likely when there
is greater income inequality and when democratic taxes are anticipated to be higher. An
interesting implication of this result is that inequality and redistribution may be negatively
correlated because higher inequality makes the capture of democratic politics more likely.
The pattern of elite control in democracy based on patronage politics and the emergence of
an ineﬃcient state organization bears some resemblance to the ineﬃcient bureaucratic struc-
tures in a number of countries. In addition to these case studies, we provided cross-country
correlations consistent with a distinctive implication of our model, that among democracies
there should be a negative relationship between the relative wages of state employees and the
amount of public good provision.
The general message from our analysis is that “not all democracies are created equal”; while
some democracies will adopt policies that redistribute to poorer segments of the society, others
may become captured by traditional elites. These captured democracies not only choose low
levels of redistribution, but, as part of their political rationale for survival, they also typically
create a range of ineﬃciencies. Our model suggests that these ineﬃciencies might be related
to the relatively poor performance of a number of democracies in Latin America and Asia.23
Analyses of the eﬀect of such policies on economic growth and investigations of other
methods via which the rich may limit the amount of redistribution in democratic politics
are interesting areas for future work. Another interesting area for further study is a more
careful empirical analysis of the relationship between the variation in the extent of government
expenditure, relative wages of state employees and potential elite capture of democratic politics.
23Another potential political factor in the poor economic performances of Latin American democracies is
“populism”. Why some countries pursue populist policies is beyond the scope of the current paper. Nevertheless,
it may be conjectured that the political environment may be more conducive to populism when the majority of
the population fare relatively badly under democracy (see Acemoglu, 2007) and the type of democratic capture
studied in this paper is likely to limit the beneﬁts of democracy for the majority of the population.
39Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
7 . 1 P r o o f so fL e m m a s1 ,2 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8a n d9
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Write the payoﬀ of an individual producer j/ ∈ Xt at time t when the tax rate
is τt and the size of (eﬀort-exerting) bureaucracy is xt as
V
j
t =m a x
©
(1 − τt)Aj,(1 − p(xt))Ajª
+ Gt + βV
j
t+1 (σ∗),
where Aj is the productivity of this individual, and σ∗ is the optimal policy, so that βV
j
t+1 (σ∗)i st h e
discounted optimal continuation value for the individual. The max incorporates two terms. The ﬁrst,
(1 − τt)Aj, is what the individual will consume if he pays a fraction τt of his income in taxes. The
second, (1 − p(xt))Aj, is his expected consumption when evading taxes. In particular, in this case, the
individual takes home his full productivity Aj with probability (1 − p(xt)), but is caught and loses all
his current income with probability p(xt). Limited liability implies c
j
t ≥ 0 and the current behavior
has no eﬀect on the continuation value βV
j
t+1 (σ∗) given the anonymity assumption. This expression
immediately establishes that the max term will pick tax evasion, i.e., z
j
t =0 ,i fp(xt) <τ t,a sc l a i m e d
in the lemma.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Write the payoﬀ of a bureaucrat j ∈ Xt at time t when the wage rate is wt
and the detection probability is qt as
V
j
t =m a x{wt − h,(1 − qt)wt} + Gt + βV
j
t+1 (σ∗),
where σ∗ is the optimal policy, so that βV
j
t+1 (σ∗) is the discounted optimal continuation value for
the individual. The max operator incorporates two terms representing the payoﬀ to exerting eﬀort and
receiving the wage for sure, wt−h,a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ to shirking. Since, by assumption, bureaucrats cannot
be ﬁred for shirking and limited liability makes sure that c
j
t ≥ 0, the payoﬀ to shirking is (1 − qt)wt.
Whenever wt <h / q t, the max operator will pick the second term, so that we have e
j
t =0f o ra l lj ∈ Xt
as claimed in the lemma.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . Given that It = 1, the solution to the equivalent of program (12) in the proof
of Proposition 2 for party R involves choosing the policy vector wt =
¡
1 − τN¢




Gt = GN ≡ 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. The policy vector in (13) is the optimal policy of the citizens in permanent
democracy (Proposition 1). Now suppose that party P is in power at time t, and suppose that it chooses
the policy vector speciﬁed in the lemma. Since this includes It = 1, the following period, we start with
It = 1 as part of the payoﬀ-relevant state vector. Suppose that σ∗ is such that v(I =1| B)=P.T h e n
party P wins the majority at time t+1. Alternatively suppose that v(I =1| B) 6= P, but X<n −1/2.
Then, party P again wins the majority at time t + 1. In both cases, repeating this argument for the
next period shows that party P keeps power at all dates and establishes the lemma.
To complete the proof we only need to rule out the case where v(I =1| B)=R and X ≥ n − 1/2
(the proof to eliminate the case where bureaucrats randomize between the two parties in a way to bring
party R to power is identical). Since v (I =1| B)=R and I = 0 is costly for the rich (recall program




AL + h, Xt = π
¡
τN¢
,G t = GN ≡ 0.
This implies that the utility of the bureaucrat is the same as a poor producer. Then denoting the utility








AL + GD + βV j (σ∗)
= V B (P),
where the inequality follows from the fact that the last term is the maximal utility of a poor agent.
Since this is also the utility that a bureaucrat will receive when party P is in power, v(I =1| B)=R
cannot be a best response, completing the proof of the lemma.
40P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . That any party, when in power and inheriting It−1 = 0, will choose wt = h/q0
follows immediately from Lemma 3 (otherwise, the investment in infrastructure K cannot be ﬁnanced
and there will be zero production). The fact that party R will choose Gt = GE ≡ 0 follows immediately
from the program in (12) after imposing wt = h/q0.T h a t p a r t y P will choose ˆ GD as in (14) follows
from the maximization problem (10) with the additional restriction that wt = h/q0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 . Lemma 6 establishes that It−1 = 0 is necessary. Now suppose that It−1 =0
and consider the scenario in which party R chooses It =0a n dXt ≥ Xt−1 (so that no current bureaucrat
will be ﬁred). Consider the case in which individual j ∈ Xt is pivotal and chooses v
j
t = R in all future










In contrast, if j ∈ Xt were to choose v
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This last expression incorporates the fact that if the poor are in power, they reform the bureaucracy,
setting It =1 ,a n dt h a tI = 1 is an absorbing state.
The comparison of (38) and (39) gives (15)–as a weak inequality–as a necessary condition for
bureaucrats to support party R when they are pivotal. Condition (16) is also necessary since, if it were
violated, bureaucrats would not be pivotal and party R would receive less than half of the votes even
with all of bureaucrats voting v
j
t = R. This argument establishes that both (15) and (16) are necessary.
Moreover, (15)–as a strict inequality–and (16) are also suﬃcient to ensure dt = R, since when both
of these conditions hold, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bureaucrats to vote for party R whenever
It−1 = 0 and the coalition of bureaucrats and the rich have a majority.
P r o o fo fL e m m a9 . Suppose that bureaucrats play v(I =0| B)=R (that is, they will vote for




AH +GD.W h e nτE ≥ ˆ τ




AH, which establishes the ﬁrst part (19).
For the second part, note that party R can always choose its myopic optimum when in power. This


















/(1 − β)i st h ec o n t i n u a t i o n
value, which follows from the observation that since, by assumption, τE < ˆ τ
E,w eh a v en−1/2 >π
¡
τE¢
and thus party R will lose the election at the next date. Then Lemma 6 implies that party P will win
all elections in all future dates. Alternatively, party R can choose X = n − 1/2 and guarantee to be in
power forever, but at the expense of taxing the rich at the higher rate ˆ τ
E. This will give a representative
rich agent utility
ˆ V R =
³






Comparison of ˆ V R with V R in the previous expression gives the second part of (19).
417.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider changes in inequality that keep mean pre-tax income, Y =( 1− n)AH +nAL,c o n s t a n t .T h i s





To prove the desired result, we need to show that (15) and (19) in Lemmas 8 and 9 are more likely
to hold when there is greater inequality, i.e., when AL is lower (and AH is given by (40)).














Next, consider condition (19) in Lemma 9. Suppose ﬁrst that τE ≥ ˆ τ











). Then, combining the government budget constraint










Y − π (τE)AL. (42)


















Instead, when τE < ˆ τ






Y − λAL , (44)
the relevant part of condition (19),
³
1 − ˆ τ
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These three expressions deﬁne θ, θ and θ
∗
. Now summarizing our analysis, an ineﬃcient state will
be created under two diﬀerent scenarios:
1. if X = π
¡
τE¢
and if conditions (41) and (43) are satisﬁed, which requires
θ ≤ h/q0 < θ;
2. if X = n − 1/2 ≡ λ and if conditions (41) and (45) are satisﬁed, which requires
θ ≤ h/q0 < θ
∗
.
We will prove that higher inequality makes the ineﬃcient state equilibrium more likely by showing
that the upper thresholds (θ in case 1 and θ
∗
in case 2) are increasing and the lower threshold, θ,i s
decreasing in the level of inequality–these naturally imply that the intervals ∆ ≡ θ−θ and ∆∗ ≡ θ
∗
−θ
increase with income inequality. We will also show that an increase in inequality does not cause a switch
from 1 to 2 or vice versa in a way to make the ineﬃcient state less likely.
We ﬁrst establish an intermediate result:













Y − π0 (τE)(τEAL + h/q0) − π (τE)AL > 0. (47)




Using (40), the equilibrium level of the public good (8) provided by the poor is






The ﬁrst-order condition (48) therefore becomes




− AL =0 . (50)
The solution for τD is always positive since K>0n e e d st ob eﬁnanced. Moreover, the assumption
that τD < 1 − π
¡
τD¢
< 1 ensures that τD < 1. Diﬀerentiating (50) gives (46).
Next, diﬀerentiating the government budget constraint (17) and using (40) gives (47), where the
denominator is positive since τE is always to the left of the peak of the Laﬀer curve.












where the expression for the limit uses the fact that ∂ ˆ GD ¡
AL¢
/∂AL exists, is ﬁnite and is independent
on β, and the inequality again follows from the assumption that τD < 1 − π
¡
τD¢
< 1. This inequality
implies that for suﬃciently high β,t h ei n e ﬃcient state becomes more attractive to bureaucrats as the
level of inequality increases.
We now show that higher inequality, represented by a decrease in AL with AH given by (40), makes








From (49), we have













































































































































































































































Since ∂τE/∂AL > 0, ∂τD/∂AL < 0a n dn>π
¡
τE¢


































where the right and side of (56) is obtained using the expression for ∂τD/∂AL in (46). Now, the log-
concavity of π(τ)i m p l i e st h a t[ π0 (τ)]
2 >π 00 (τ)π(τ)a n di ss u ﬃcient to ensure that (56) is negative.






are negative, and therefore ∂θ/∂AL < 0
as desired. Note that this conclusion holds irrespective of the value of β.
Case 2: X = n − 1/2 ≡ λ.
The proof parallels that of case 1. From (45), using (52) and the fact that Y −λAL =( 1− n)AH +
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Diﬀerentiating (57) and using (54), (58) and the fact that ∂τE/∂AL exists and is independent of














































































Since ∂τD/∂AL < 0, π0 ¡
τD¢






















where the right hand side of (60) is obtained using the expression for ∂τD/∂AL in (46). This condition is
equivalent to (56) and the log-concavity of π(τ)i ss u ﬃcient to ensure it. This establishes that ∂θ
∗
/∂AL
is negative for suﬃciently high β as desired.
The proof so far has established that the lower threshold θ declines as inequality increases and that
the upper thresholds θ and θ
∗
increase as inequality increases. To complete the proof of the proposition,
we need to ensure that there would be no switch from the wider to the smaller interval, which could
happen if we have a switch from τE ≥ ˆ τ
E to τE < ˆ τ
E, or vice versa. However, as β → 1, we have that
(19) is equivalent to
if τE ≥ ˆ τ














if τE < ˆ τ







= n − 1/2 ≡ λ and
³




so that for β suﬃciently large, at the point of a possible switch, τE =ˆ τ
E,w eh a v eθ = θ
∗
.T h i s
completes the proof.¥
7.3 Proof of Lemma 16
Suppose that the bureaucratic wage is given by ˜ wE in (31). Then the incentive compatibility constraint
(26) of the bureaucrats inspecting low-skill producers is satisﬁed even when the producers oﬀer a bribe
as large as their income AL.H o l d i n gτ ﬁxed, a decrease in w from ˜ wE will allow bureaucrats to accept
bribes, and thus reduce government revenues to zero. Therefore, it cannot be optimal. Increasing w is
also not beneﬁcial for the rich.
Condition (29), on the other hand, ensures that the poor choose to pay taxes. Holding w ﬁxed at
˜ wE, increasing taxes would induce the poor not to pay taxes and is therefore not beneﬁcial. Reducing
taxes is also not beneﬁcial. Given (31) and (32), it is also straightforward to verify that the utility of
the rich is decreasing in G, so that this variable is set equal to zero.
This argument shows that (31) and (32) gives a stationary point of the optimization problem of the
rich, since the rich will not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to change either one of x or w by itself. To complete the
proof, we need to show that it is also not beneﬁcial to change x and w simultaneously. We will do this
by showing that the payoﬀ function of the rich is strictly quasi-concave. Consider the problem of the
45rich if they do not pay taxes. Clearly, constraints (29) and (30) in equilibrium hold as equalities. We
can thus solve out for the tax rate from the government budget constraint as
τ =
xw + K + G
(n − x)AL .
Substituting this expression into (29), we obtain
w =
K + G
[q0/(1 − q0)](n − x)p(x) − x
, (61)
provided that w ≥ (1 − q0)AL/q0 (which will be true in equilibrium). Now, substituting (61) in the
objective function of the rich (28), and observing that this is maximized at G = 0, we can represent the
problem of the rich as the following single dimensional maximization problem
max
x U (x)=AH −
K
(n − x) − (1 − q0)x/q0p(x)
.
If this problem is strictly quasi-concave, it must have a unique solution. Corresponding to this
unique x, there will be unique levels of τ and w, since these variables are deﬁned uniquely by the
previous equalities. To check that this function is indeed strictly quasi-concave, note that
U0 (x)=−
1+( 1− q0)/q0p(x) − (1 − q0)[p0 (x)x]/q0 [p(x)]
2
[(n − x) − (1 − q0)x/q0p(x)]
2 K.
For U (x) to be strictly quasi concave, it is suﬃcient that its second derivative is negative when
U0 (x) = 0. For this, it is suﬃcient for −
n
[p(x)]
2 +( 1− q0)p(x)/q0 − (1 − q0)[p0 (x)x]/q0
o
to be
strictly decreasing in x. It can be easily veriﬁed that this is always the case since p(x)i si n c r e a s i n ga n d
concave in x. This completes the proof that (31) and (32) is optimal for the rich when they prefer not
to pay taxes. ¥
46Appendix B: Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
Our dataset builds on the cross-country dataset compiled by Persson and Tabellini (2003) (henceforth
PT). Our sample of “stable democracies” consists of countries with an average Polity score greater than
or equal to 5 over the period 1990-1998. We also report results with a sample containing all democracies
(deﬁned as countries with average Polity score greater than 0 over the period 1990-1998). With the
exception of the average government wage to per capita GDP (which comes from the World Bank), all
our variables are from PT’s dataset. These variables are the following:
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP: constructed using the item
Government Finance-Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100.
Source: IMF-IFS CD-Rom and IMF-IFS Yearbook.
Consolidated central government expenditures on social services and welfare as per-
centage of GDP: from the GFS Yearbook, divided by GDP and multiplied by 100. Source: IMF-GFS
Yearbook 2000 and IMF-IFS CD-Rom.
Log GDP per capita: per capita real GDP deﬁned as real GDP per capita in constant dollars
(chain index) expressed in international prices, base year 1985. Data through 1992 are taken from the
Penn World Table 5.6, while data on the period 1993-98 are computed from data taken from the World
Development Indicators, the World Bank. These later observations are computed on the basis of the
latest observation available from the Penn Word Tables and the growth rates of GDP per capita in the
subsequent years computed from the series of GDP at market prices (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars) and
population, from the World Development Indicators.
Sources: Penn World Tables - mark 5.6 (PWT), available on
http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/docs/topic.html.
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, available on
http://www.worldbank.org.
Polity: score for democracy, computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score,
and ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). AUTOC (DEMOC) is
the index of autocracy (democracy), derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participa-
tion, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and
constraints on the chief executive.
Source: Polity IV Project (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm).
Age structure variables: percentage of population between the ages of 15 and 64 in the total
population and percentage of population over the age of 65 in the total population.
Source: World Development Indicators CD-Rom 1999.
Average government wage relative to per capita GDP: mean value of the average government
wage to per capita GDP between 1991 and 2000. It is computed as the average of the two data points
available for the periods 1991-95 and 1996-2000. When data for one of the two periods are not available,
only the available time period is used. The variable is calculated by dividing the average government
wage by the GDP per capita ﬁgure. The average government wage is calculated as the total central
government wage bill divided by the number of employees in total central government. The total central
government wage bill is the sum of wages and salaries paid to central government employees, including
armed forces personnel. The number of employees in total central government is the sum of total civilian
central government and the Armed Forces.
Source: Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee (1997), Table A-3,
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default.
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51Table 1. The Relationship Between Bureaucratic Wage and Government Expenditures 
 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
            
            
            
  Dependent variable is government expenditures  
as a percentage of GDP 
  Dependent variable is government expenditures on 
social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP 
            
            
Average government wage to per capita GDP  -4.96  -3.63  -3.66  -1.82    -3.91  -2.85  -2.84  -0.80 
  (1.01) (1.07) (1.03) (0.85)    (0.65) (0.56) (0.56) (1.08) 
             
Log of per capita real GDP    4.19  2.04  -0.90      4.02  2.91  0.24 
    (1.63) (2.18) (2.29)      (0.9)  (1.27) (1.13) 
             
Polity       1.7  0.17        0.84  0.01 
     (1.05)  (1.11)        (0.54)  (0.33) 
             
Percentage of population between         -0.69          -0.24 
15 and 64 years old        (0.37)          (0.16) 
             
Percentage of population over 65 years old        1.95          1.28 
      (0.28)        (0.22) 
             
             
R
2    0.23 0.31 0.34 0.57    0.3  0.5  0.52 0.77 
Number  of  observations  51 51 51 51    46 46 46 46 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample consists of countries with an average polity index for the period 1990-98 greater than or equal to 5. The dependent 
variable in columns (1)-(4) is central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP for the period 1990-98. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is consolidated 
central government expenditures on social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP for the period 1990-98. Average government wage to per capita GDP is the ratio of 
the total central government wage bill to the number of central government employees for the period 1991-2000. The log of per capita real GDP is the natural log of the real 
GDP per capita in constant 1985 dollars, averaged for the period 1992-98. All data are from Persson and Tabellini (2003) except the average government wage to per capita 




Figure 1. The figure reports the fitted values of the unconditional relationship between average government 
wage to per capita GDP and central government expenditures as percentage of GDP for the sample of 
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Average Government Wage to Per Capita GDP
Redistribution and Public Sector Relative Wage: Conditional Relationship
coef = -3.6604963, (robust) se = 1.0318145, t = -3.55
 
 
Figure 2. The figure reports the fitted values of the conditional relationship between average government 
wage to per capita GDP and government expenditures as percentage of GDP for the sample of countries with 
an average polity index for the period 1990-98 greater than or equal to 5. The control variables are the log of 
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Average Government Wage to Per Capita GDP
Redistribution and Public Sector Relative Wage: Unconditional Relationship
coef = -4.9601277, (robust) se = 1.0127675, t = -4.9